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CHAPTER I 
THE CONQUE~ED SOUTH 
The South which was returned to the native 
whites when President Hayes withdrew the federal 
troops, was unable to return to the past that it 
had known before the war. In half a generation, 
war and reconstruction had decimated the popula-
tion, destroyed what was perhaps the chief single 
type of property, and wrought tremendous social up-
heavals. As the Southerners regained control of their 
state governments, they faced two possible alternatives: 
they might attempt to recreate the social, economic 
and political structure of the Old South, or they 
might imitate the North in an effort to bring the South 
abreast of the national development. Nostalgia beck-
oned them to the old way of life; the "Yankee" virus 
of ambition and progress pointed the way to a "New 
South". 
This was in 1876 eleven years after the armies 
of the Union and the Confederacy had been disbanded. 
Eleven long years, finally the silver lining was 
beginning to border the black clouds that had hung 
over the defeated South. Eleven years, and finally 
I 
2 
the South could look to the future with some spark 
of hope, hope that had all but died in the strongest 
of hearts during the dark years of reconstruction, 
years which had embittered for life many a Southerner, 
years whch taught him to hate the "damned Yankee." 
The Confederate army was disbanded in 1865 and, 
as the Confederate soldiers came straggling back to 
their communities, their hearts were crushed with 
memories of the lost cause, and by the sight of the 
deplorable conditions that met them. They found 
many of their former neighbors missing; they found 
property destroyed, the labor system disorganized, 
and the inhabitants in many places suffering from 
want; they also found the white people\ demoralized 
and sometimes divided among themselves, the Negroes 
freed, bewildered, and disordered for organized 
government had lapsed with the surrender of the 
Confederate armies. l 
1. J. G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction, 
D. G. Heath Company, New York, 1937, 691-694 
3 
Around this disorganized society lay a devasted 
land. ihe destruction of property affected all classes 
of the population. The accumulated capital of the 
South had disappeared in worthless confederate stocks, 
bonds and currency. The banks had failed early in 
the war, and two billion dollars invested in slaves 
had been wiped out. Factories which had been running 
before the war, or which were developed after 1861 
to supply the blockaded country, had been destroyed 
by Federal raiders, or seized and sold, or dismantled 
because they had furnished supplies to the Confederacy. 
The mining industry was paralized. Public buildings 
which had been used for war purposes were destroyed 
or confiscated for the use of the army or for the 
new freedmen's schools. It took months before court-
houses, state capitols, school and college buildings 
could again be made available for normal useo 2 
2. James Truslow Adams, America's Tragedy, Charles 
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1935, 385. 
4 
As a result, we would hardly expect the 
economic outlook to be very encouraging at the be-
ginning of reconstruction. In Mississippi, as in 
the other Sourhern States, the people were generally 
impoverished for farms had gone to waste; fences had 
been torn down or rotted away; fields were overgrown 
with weeds and bushes; farm implements were rusted 
and tools broken beyond use; live stock had disappeared, 
hardly enough animals remained to meet the demands 
of agriculture. 3 All this spelled the ruin and 
abandonment of the plantations, once the pride of 
the South. Even small farms were delapidated; farmers 
and planters everywhere found themselves "land poor". 
There was enough land to satisfy the most greedy, 
but without labor, equipment, seed and money, all was 
as nothing. "A man with hundreds of acres might be as 
4 poor as a negro refugee." 
3. James Wilford Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi, 
The Macmillan Company, New York, 1901, 122. 
4. Walter Lynwood Fleming, The Sequel of Appomattox, 
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1921, 3. 
5 
In a desperate attempt to raise money for the 
necessities of life, so many acres were put on the 
market at such a low level that the land depreciated 
to an almost unbelievable price. Poorer farmers 
rejoiced if they received as little as twenty-five 
cents for an acre, while the best of the plantations 
were sacrificed at three dollars per acre. 5 In 
Mississippi, land depreciation in one county alone 
. 6 
reached $10,000,000. And the revenue from the sale 
of land proved of little help to the needy whites. 
Stocks of merchandise in the South had disappeared 
because Northern merchants had sustained a heavy loss 
with the failure of Southern markets and they were 
cautious about extending credit. Window glass, furni-
ture, dishes, cooking utensils, pins, needles and 
thread and other necessities were wanting.? 
The greatest loss by far was that of the emanci-
pated slaves. For the entire South, the financial loss 
8 
was estimated at somewhere over two billion dollars. 
5. Garner, 135 
6. Ibid., 124-125 
? 1i'leming~ 5 
8. Adams v?9 
6 
Mississippi, the state with the largest number of 
slaves, suffered tremendously. One county alone, 
Hinds County, claimed to have lost $11,000,000 
9 
through the liberation. Moreover, the negro was 
not only lost property, he was lost labor; and the 
readjustment of the labor system to new conditions 
growing out of emancipation taxed the best minds of 
the North and South; a problem that even today remains 
unsolved. 
Not one planter in ten believed that free negro 
labor could be made profitable; if the Negroes were 
to work, compulsion was necessary. Freed from their 
bondage, the Negroes reveled in a sort of protracted 
holiday, and even they knew that this could not go on. 
Their once fine dreams of "forty acres and a mule" 
proved to be no more than bubbles bursting in their 
faces. Disease and starvation drove them to seek help 
from their former masters, but even then the planters 
9. Garner, 125 
7 
found themselves hard pressed for suitable labor. 
To insure steady labor, landowners were willing to 
contract for laborers, however the Negro refused to 
contract for a whole year and insisted upon employ-
ment by the month, according to the rules of the 
10 
Freedmen's bureau. 'rhis was, of course, a very 
unsatisfactory method for the CUltivation of cotton, 
because of the almost moral certainty that the Negro 
would make a change of employers at the end of the 
month and leave the crop owner with a large invest-
ment and scant hope of harvest. Many liberated slaves 
were so shiftless and so incapable of assuming respon-
sibilities that they and their families were wiped 
11 
out by starvation or disease. 
10. William archibald Dunning, Reconstruction, 
Political and Economic, Harper and Brothers, 
New York, 1907, 46. 
11. The State census of Mississippi showed in 1866 
a decrease of 56,146 in the negro population. 
Most of these are believed to have "died from 
disease and starvation resulting from their 
sudden emancipation. 1I Garner, 124. 
- ._- ---- -~-------
8 
Reconstruction in the South might have been 
managed in spite of the emancipation of the Negro, 
if the manpower of the whites had not also suffered. 
In Mississippi, as in other states, there was hardly 
a home in which there was not mourning for some 
member of the family who had been killed in the war. 
Those who had made the sacrifice were the young and 
vigorous who were now so much needed in the work of 
economic reorganization. It is no exaggeration to 
say that in Mississippi one half of the male whites 
fell in the lost cause, while one half of those 
remaining bore "unmistakenable evidence of severe 
12 
campaigning." 
In desperation, the people of the South turned 
their attention to the importation of white immigrants 
13 
from the North and from Europe. 
120 Ibid., 123 
130 Ibid., 135-136 
9 
Associations were formed and agents were sent 
abroad to solicit the aid of both German and French 
farmers. '.L'hese efforts, however, met with little 
success, and even if importation of labor had proved 
successful they could not have reached the South in 
time to save the crops. The soldiers on their return 
found it too late to plant even what few crops the 
meager resources permitted. 
The virtual failure of the attempt to procure a 
supply of white laborers by immigration made it neces-
sary to fall back upon the Negro, but how this was 
to be accomplished was another question. 'lohe 
planters had to safeguard their interests and at the 
same time make working profitable for the Negro. 
But several economic elements appeared to facilitate 
the solution of this problem. '.L'he white man owned 
the land, stock and farming implements; the freedmen 
could furnish the labor. The relative value of each 
was a problem to be determined by experiment. Some 
landowners rented their land for a stipulated sum, 
but when they realized how difficult it was to collect 
10 
the rent from poverty stricken tenants, this plan 
was soon abandoned. Others, however, rented their 
land for a stipulated share of the produce, but 
this did not appeal to the colored folks since they 
had neither stock nor implements to work a farm. 
'llhe most common method adopted was the "share system." 
The freedmen were not able to equip a farm nor secure 
credit, whereas the planters could. And these planters 
agreed to furnish the land, seed, farm implements and 
animals, and, most of all, give security for any sup-
plies the Negro might need. The Negro was to plant, 
cultivate and gather the crops in return for a cer-
tain portion of them, usually one-half, though in 
14 
some cases only a third. 
However successful such a system might have been 
in other states, in Mississippi, even this system was 
disasterous to both parties in 1866 and 1867, when, 
because of floods, drought and insects, the yield was 
not sufficient to pay for the food and clothing of the 
140 Ibid., 136-138 
11 
laborers. The failure, however, was not due solely 
to unfavorable seasons, but in a great measure to 
the unreliable character of the Negro, whose under-
takings nearly always ended in failure. He was peculi-
arly unfitted for the cultivation of cotton, which 
demands careful attention for the greater part of the 
year. "Free to go where he pleased, and to own fire 
arms, he hunted and fished, attended 'frolics' and 
protracted meetings, while the grass choked his cotton 
15 
to death." 
Together with the "share system" there developed 
a system of credit which made matters worse. Poverty 
stricken planters mortgaged their future crops to a 
merchant or landlord in exchange for subsistence until 
the harvest. But as so otten happened, even the mort-
gager was not able to finance his tenant and he had 
to be supplied by the banker, who having gained control 
by this means could then dictate what crops were to be 
planted as well as the time of the sale. As a result, 
15. Ibid., 138 
12 
"the planter or farmer was held to staple crops, 
high prices for necessities, high interest rates 
and frequently unfair bookkeeping." 
16 
To the 
thrifty, industrious and intelligent man, such a 
system was well suited, but it had a disastrous 
effect upon the average tenant, who had too small 
a share of the crop to feel a strong sense of respon-
sibility as well as too many "privileges" and too 
little supervision to .make him eager to produce the 
17 
best results. 
In the belief that the Negroes would work better 
for a Northerner, every planter who could do so se-
cured a Northern partner and manager. Such an offer 
appealed strongly to many an ex-union soldier, who 
during his stay in Mississippi had been attracted 
by great profits in cotton growing. When offers 
failed, these men bought land of their own, lured by 
18 
its cheapness and the high price of cotton. It 
16. Fleming, 270 
17. Dunning, 213-214 
18. Adams, 388-389 
13 
was the concensus of opinion among these immi-
grants, that with a bit of ingenuity they could 
introduce scientific methods and thus revolution-
ize cotton planting. They also felt that they 
knew the solution to the negro labor problem, but 
in both cases they were sadly mistaken. The un-
tiring energy and thrift of the Northern planter, 
and the exacting nature of the service which he 
demanded, did not appeal to the slow-going freed-
man accustomed to the patience and forebearance 
of the Southerner. No one was so quick to declaim 
the unreliability of the Negro as those who had 
19 
helped to emancipate him. 
The Northern overseers, too, were so far 
from revolutionizing the methods of cotton culture, 
that it is not too much to say that they had failed 
in their efforts to reclaim the lands of the South, 
and with the inauguration of the reconstruction 
19. Garner, 137-139 
14 
policy in 1867, they virtually abandoned the 
20 
land and became office holders. 
Acute distress continued until late in 1867, 
but after that year the wolf no longer menaced 
the doors of the common folk. ouch were the hard-
ships, that many a poor white man never again 
reached a comfortable standard of living; some 
were so demoralized that they lost all hope or 
desire to better their state, while others were so 
discouraged that they sought relief in the Viest and 
North. But to the credit of the stalwart South, 
the mass of people "accepted the discipline of 
21 
poverty and made the best of it." 
20. Garner holds that these men are improperly re-
ferred to as "carpetbaggers" for "they did not 
go South to get offices, for there were no 
offices for them to fill at that time. The 
causes which led them to settle in the South 
were purely economic and not political." 
(Garner, 136) But if we take Randall's defi-
nition of "carpetbagger" --"one who went South 
to make money and seize political power--"then 
the term is rightfully applied to this class of 
men. (Randall, 847)0 
21. .it'leming, 16. 
15 
Not only the planters and laborers suf-
fered during these critical days, but much of 
the burden was shouldered by those who in the 
pre-war days knew not the meaning of work. The 
general paralysis of industry, the breaking up 
of society, poverty on all sides made life onerous. 
Physicians found no dearth of patients, but could 
not even depend upon the ordinary fees. Lawyers 
who had supported the Confederacy found it diffi-
cult to get back into reorganized courts because 
of the test oaths and the law practice was jealously 
guarded by "legal" attorneys. Education likewise 
22 
suffered as school masters were very few. 
Amid such confusion a change in the Negro 
character and life was inevitable. His once cheer-
ful spirits were now dampened as he faced the 
serious matter of providing for himself and his 
family. Since the discipline which accompanied 
slavery could no longer keep him in check, the 
Negro ran into excesses of petty criminality. 
22. Ibid., 16. 
16 
Theft was frequent, arson was accepted as a 
means of revenge on the whites, and murder became 
common in the brawls of the freedmen's quarters. 
Morals and manners also suffered under the new 
dispensation. In the crowded and diseased stricken 
towns and camps, the conditions under which the 
roving Negro lived were less conducive to morals 
than to health, for here "there were none of the 
restraints to which the blacks had been accustomed 
and which they now despised as being a part of their 
23 
servitude." What good manners they once may have 
had were now replaced by impudence and distrust 
because agitators, who were at work among them 
taught that politeness to the whites was the ear-
mark of servility. 
During these critical times, the demands of the 
Radicals for social equality fanned the embers that 
lay smoldering in the hearts of the freedmen. In 
Mississippi, it is true, intermarriage was legalized, 
23. Ibid., 42. 
17 
but for the most part the "Jim Crow" theory--sepa-
24 
ration but equality-- was the ruling norm. Charles 
Sumner, a persistent agitator for equal rights,openly 
attacked the Jim Crow practice, labeling it "an in-
suIt and a hinderance, and a bar, which not only de-
stroys comfort and prevents equality, but weakens all 
25 
other rights". 
24. Garner, 285-287. 
25. Fleming, 276 
18 
As a final tribute to this rabid reconstructionist 
the Radical Congress in 1875 passed the Civil Rights 
Act which gave the Negroes equal rights in hotels, 
26 
places of amusement, on public carriers and on juries. 
By the fires of reconstruction the whites were 
fused into a more homogenous society. At first they 
26. The text and veto of this Act may be found in 
Henry Steele Commager's book: Documents of 
American History, F. S. Croft & Co., New York, 
1943, Vol. II, 86-88. Strangely enough such 
legislation, according to Dunning, (Essays Qg 
the Civil War and Reconstruction, 365-368), found 
favor with the Democratic leaders, but for a 
different reason. '~'hey realized :eull well that 
it would have little effect except in the border 
and Northern States, where it would turn thousands 
into the Democratic fold. They also felt that 
such legislation would in time be declared uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court. And so it 
happened. This Act, however, should not be con-
fused with the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which 
was designed to protect the freedmen from such 
discriminating legislation as the Black Codes. 
It was vetoed by President Johnson and passed 
again over his veto. The Act conferred citizen-
ship upon the negroes, legislation necessitated 
by the Dred Scott decision. Doubt as to the 
constitutionality of the measure induced Congress 
to enact most of its prOVisions into the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Commager, 14-18. 
19 
excused the Negro, for they knew he was not to be 
blamed; but as misrule continued there was united 
opposition against the ~egro in politics. The 
whites were sick and tired of being ruled as a con-
quered province by the incompetent and dishonest; 
they felt no gratitude for any so-called leniency 
on the part of the North; they felt no repentance 
for the war, nor did they desire humiliation, sack-
cloth and ashes. They were bitter because of perse-
cution, resentful because of poor education, sullen 
because of overwork, and despondent because the 
future offered little hope for betterment. Coming 
into their own were new political leaders, shrewd, 
narrow, conservative, honest, parsimonious; but the 
constant fighting fire with fire scorched all. "In 
the bitter discipline of reconstruction, the pleasant-
27 
est side of Southern life came to an end." The 
material evils of reconstruction were only temporary, 
for state debts have been paid or cancelled, and 
wasted resources renewed; but the moral and intellec-
tual consequences of the revolution remain as a 
lasting blemish on the pages of our history. 
27. Fleming, 281 
CHAPTER II 
THE ADVOCATES OF ~mRCY 
1863 - 1866 
The close of the Civil War found the nation, 
as well as the several sections of the country, 
facing a variety of complicated and pressing social, 
economic, and political problems. Vast armies had 
to be demobilized and re-absorbed into the eco~omic 
life of the nation; production of materials for war 
had to give way to production of machinery, to build-
ing railroads and tilling the soil. The civil, as 
well as the social, and economic status of the Negro 
had to be re-adjusted in the light of the outcome of 
the war. The federal government also had to face 
the problem of how to determine the basis on which 
the lately rebellious states should again become 
normal units of the nation. 'I'hese problems had to be 
solved at a time when prejudices and hatred, enkindled 
by the war, still ruled the hearts of men. They were 
met by party conventions and legislatures with all 
the limitations of partisanship that these terms imply. 
In the North there were two schools of thought 
concerning treatment of the southern states--the con-
20 
21 
servative and the radical camps. Each group 
claimed its host of supporters. 'lihe radicals 
desired a stern reckoning with all "rebels", 
which for them meant imprisonment, and in some 
cases even the execution of the leaders, and they 
also hoped to effect an immediate extension of the 
right to vote to the Negroes. The conservatives on 
the other hand were inclined toward more gentle meas-
ures, since they desired postponment of the heated 
suffrage question until satisfactory plans could 
be drawn up. President Lincoln was the champion 
of this party. 
It was Lincoln's firm conviction that, though 
there had been a rupture of the federation, the 
southern states had not forfeited their membership 
in the Union. Consequently, the problem, as he 
saw it was that of re-cementing the bonds of the 
union, and he was willing to do this in a fatherly 
spirit. Late in 1863 his plan was outlined in a 
proclamation in which he offered pardon to all, 
with the exception of the leaders of the Confederacy, 
provided that they would take the oath of loyalty 
to the Union, and recognize the laws and proclamations 
22 
in regard to slavery. It also provided that as 
soon as the number of citizens thus reinstated in 
each state reached ten per cent of the number of 
votes cast in that state at the election of 1860, 
these citizens might establish a government which he 
1 
would recognize. It was sincerely hoped that the 
people of the South would gather around this nucleus 
of loyal voters and soon the reorganization would be 
2 
complete. 
Such a lenient plan was openly opposed by the 
radicals because, in general, it left too much power 
in the hands of the southern states, and, in parti-
cular, because the question of negro suffrage was to 
be decided by each state. It was evident, then, that 
there would be an open struggle between the conflict-
ing camps. 
Upon the rejection of the plan proposed by 
Lincoln, Congress set about drawing up a policy of 
its own in the Wade - Davis Bill of July, 1864. 
1. 
2. 
Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American 
History, F. S. Croft & Co. New York, 1943 Vol. 
1,429 - 431. 
J. G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction. 
D. C. Heath & Co., New York, 1937, 699. 
23 
This legislation declared the southern states 
outside the Union, and outlined the conditions for 
their re-admission; a majority of the people in any 
given state would be required to take the oath of 
allegiance before they would be permitted to elect a 
constitutional convention for the purpose of inaugur-
ating a new state government. Conditions set down for 
the assembling of this convention were such that "no 
person who held or exercised any office, civil or mili-
tary, state or confederate, under the rebel usurpation, 
or who voluntarily bore arms against the United States" 
had the right to vote or was eligible for election as 
3 
delegate to such a convention. The convention, once 
convened, was obliged to declare on behalf of the 
people of the State that, those who had held civil 
offices, and those confederate military officers above 
the rank of colonel would be deprived of the right to 
vote or to hold public office; that slavery was to be 
abolished, and the confederate debt was to be repud-
4 
iated. The first provision barred the majority of 
3. Commager, 437 
4. ~bid., 438 
24 
of white men from participation in the reaon-
struction of their state, and the latter deprived 
the cream of the southern gentry from holding 
public office. fhis policy was so drastic that 
Lincoln refused to sign the bill and it was even-
~ tually killed by the pocket veto. But the cause 
of the conservatives was doomed with the assassi-
nation of their leader on April 14, 1865. 
Had Lincoln not fallen at the hands of an 
assassin his leadership might have welded the 
structure of the Union. His untimely death was a 
catastrophe far greater than was realized. Though 
the standards were gallantly taken up by the new 
President, ~~. Johnson, it was soon evident that 
without the leadership and support of his party, 
the President's good will and practical judgment 
would come to nought. 
On May 29, 1865, President Johnson, issued 
6 
his proclamation of amnesty and pardon. In the 
5. Randall, 699-?00 
6. Commager, Vol. II, ?-8. 
25 
main, it promulgated the same principles as Lincoln 
I 
had enunciated in December 1863. It differed in the 
oath it prescribed as a condition of pardonJ In all 
essential points, however, Andrew Johnson furthered 
the plan of the late president. To the consternation 
of the radicals, he planned to restrict voting power 
in the South to the whites, leaving the question of 
8 
negro suffrage to the discretion of each state. Such 
benevolence won the support of the majority of the 
people from the North, and in the South it also met 
with whole hearted cooperation as men quickly presented 
themselves for pardon and assisted in establishing new 
state governments.9 Also of equal importance was the 
president's proclamation issued on the same day appoiht-
ing a provisional governor of North Carolina in which 





James T. Adams, 
Sons, New York, 
Randall, 74. 
429-431; Vol. II, 7-8. 




~he provisional governor was instructed to call 
a convention to be chosen by the "Loyal" people of the 
state for the express purpose of making the necessary 
constitutional changes prior to Federal restoration. 
Only those who had subscribed to the oath of amnesty 
were granted the right to vote, and from their number 
10 
the delegates were to be chosen. Temporary civil 
governments for the states were to be administered under 
the authority of the provisional governor, while Federal 
functions were to be resumed by the proper officials. 
"Side by side with the military authority of the United 
States was to be put in operation, as fast as the offices 
could be manned, the regular processes of civil govern-
11 
ment so far as these fell within the Federal sphere". 
10. William A. Dunning, Reconstruction, Political and 
Economic, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1907, 37. 
11. Ibid., 39 
27 
In the view of later developments it is important 
to remember that Johnson's plan for reconstruction 
did not rest upon his own personal authority, but "it 
was fully discussed in the cabinet, no member of which 
expressed a doubt of the power of the executive branch 
of the government to reorganize state governments, which 
12 
had been in rebellion, without the aid of Congress." 
This impetus set the wheels of reconstruction in 
motion and within a year identicla proclamations were 
issued in favor of the remaining six states of the 
Confederacy. Mississippi received Judge Sharkey as 
provisional governor according to a proclamation issued 
on June 13, 1865. As time was too precious to waste, 
and no one realized this more than the governor, he 
exhort'ad his people to conform to the demands of the 
President and to prepare for a constitutional convention 
to be held on August 14, 1865. 
The Mississippi convention was the first in the 
Southern States to convene under the president's policy, 
so consequently the eyes of the nation were focused upon 
12. Randall, 713 where he cites from the House Report 
No.7, 40 Congress, 1 sess., 401. 
28 
13 
its proceedings. The problems that faced that 
convention were momentous. Governor Sharkey, after 
administering the amnesty oath, laid before the 
delegates the program vvhich the president "ardently 
14 
desired" them to accept. The delegates, however, 
had minds of their own, and only after long hours 
of debate and bickering did Mississippi adopt the 
required bills necessary for restoration. ~he first 
function of the Convention was to signify by formal 
acts the acceptance of the results of the war. This 
was followed by heated arguments concerning the abo-
lition of slavery. Only after the convincing address 
of William Yeoger, "a man of conservative views and 
15 
one of the ablest lawyers in the state, was a majority 
vote obtained in favor of the ordinance which declared 
that "slavery, having been destroyed in the state of 
Mississippi, neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, 
13. Dunbar Rowland, History of Mississippi, S. J. Clarke 
Publishing Company, Chicago, 1925, Vol. II, Ill. 
14. James Wilford Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi, 
The MacMillan Company, New York, 1901, 84 - 85. 
15. Ibid., 88 
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except in punishment for crime, whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted, shall hereafter 
16 
exist in the state. 
Thus perished slavery in Mississippi, 
killed in the house of its friends, and by 
those who loved the institution most. This 
was the great work of the convention. After 
all, it was but an involuntary acknowledge-
ment of a fact already existing. 17 
In the few remaining days of the convention, the 
delegates, in accord with the president's wishes, 
declared null and void the obnoxious ordinances of 
secession, and repudiated the state debts contracted 
in prosecuting the war against the United States 
government. Finally such modifications in the old 
state constitution were made as would bring it into 
18 
accord with the new situation. 
16. Convention Journal, 164, as quoted by Garner, 90 
17. Garner, 90 
18. Ibid., 82 - 94 
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'l'his was bitter medicine for the southerners but 
the thought of restored health helped to make it 
palatable. 
~he Convention set October 2 as the date for 
the election of congressmen, and state, district, 
and county officers, under the restrictions of the 
19 
presidential amnesty proclamation. General 
Benjamin G. Humphreys won the people's choice for 
the governorship, and the legislature which assembled 
on October 16, 1865, was the last to be elected by 
20 
an exclusively white vote. The oampaign preceed-
ing this election pivoted around the issue of admit-
ing Negroes in the courts as witnesses. The opponents 
of negro testimony succeeded in electing a majority 
21 
of the legislature. Consequently the most important 
and the most delicate subject which this body had to 
meet was that of the relationship between the whites 
and the recently freed Negroes. The constitutional 
19. Rowland, 113 
20. Ibid .• 116 
21. Robert Selph Henry, The Story of Reconstruction, 
The Bobbs - Merrill Co. New York, 1938, 97 
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Convention had appointed a committee to make a 
study of this touchy question and its report was 
duly submitted to the new legislature. 'i'hat such 
22 
legislation was necessary no one will question. 
It was unfortunate, however, that laws had to be 
passed at a tLme when the wounds of war were still 
smarting. 
Mississippi met this problem with the passage 
23 
of the Black Codes which regulated civil rights, 
apprenticeships, vagrancy, and penal crimes. Such 
legislation met with violent opposition in the North 
and proved to be the weak link in President Johnson's 
chain by which he had hoped to secure Mississippi and 
the southern states to the Union. 
This faux ~ of Mississippi's legislature was 
followed by the rejection of the thirteenth amendment. 
Governor Humphrey recommended that the first section-
the abolition of slavery in all territory within the 
United States-be adopted, but that Section 2, empower_ 
ing Congress to "enforce" the article by appropriate 
22. Walter Lynwood Fleming, The Sequel of ApDomattox, 
The Yale University Press, New Haven, 1921, 89-96 
23. Comma er Vol. 92-95 
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legislation, be rejected. A joint standing 
committee, however, submitted a report stating 
that the first and main article of the amendment 
had already been adopted by the state and that the 
second article of the amendment "opened the door to 
further abuses of power by the Federal government 
24 
and interference with the rights of the state." 
This report concluded: "Connected as the provisions 
are, a ratification of the first and a rejection of 
the second would be inoperative and of no effect; 
25 
therefore, the rejection of both is recommended." 
The report was adopted. This was the second step in 
the defeat of President Johnson's plan of reconstruc-
26 
tion. 
The effect of "Mississippi's mistakes "were not 
immediately felt. In fact the events that followed 
gave no indication that errors had been made at all. 
By the end of the year the provisional governor of 
Mississippi, was relieved of his duties and the 
24. Rowland, 124-125 
25. Garner, 120 
26. Ibid. 121 
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civil government was in full exercise of its 
functions. On April 2, 1866, President Johnson 
formally declared the rebellion at an end in all 
the seceeded states except Texas. On August 20, 
1866 he proclaimed "the complete restoration of peace, 
order, tranquillity, and civil authority throughout 
27 
the United States." 
27. Dunning, 41 
GHAPTER III 
CONGRESS DOMINATES 
1866 - 1867 
Although Southern ships of state were launched 
on supposedly peaceful waters, on the very day that 
President Johnson announced that "peace and tranqui-
lity" had been restored, the sky was overcast. The 
storm 'IIvhich was brewing was soon to break loose in 
all its fury. The radical Republican members of 
congress were irate. 
Opposition to the Presidential Plan was not 
unforseen. There had been opposition while Lincoln 
1 
lived; later it reached its heighth under the leader-
ship of Thaddeus Stevens, the guiding spirit of the 
2 
radical wing of the Union party. This group had 
its own mind on. reconstruction. 
Their aims included the proscription of the 
Confederate leaders, extensive confiscation 
of plantations in the South, the enfranchise-
ment of the freedmen, and the postponement 
of political reorganization in the States 
till the continued ascendency of the Union 
party could be insured. 3 
1. Cf. Chapter 2, p. 2-4 
2. James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States, 
the MacMillan Company, London, 1909, Vol. V 531 ff. 
3. William Archibald Dunning, Reconstruction, Political 
and Economic, Harper and Brothers, New York,1907, 420 
34 
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These planks were completely destroyed as the 
administration's policy was unfolded. ~he Proclama-
tion of Amnesty had offset their desire to punish 
the confederates. Confiscation was stopped short 
by the attorney-general's decision that the property 
which had been seized by the Federal authorities 
under the confiscation acts mBst be restored to the 
4 
pardoned owners. Negro suffrage was doomed by the 
franchise provisions of Johnson's proclamation; and 
the hasty reorganization of state governments under 
southern leadership jeopardized the Union party and 
threatened their control of the national government. 
Above all this, Congress feared that the extensive 
power which the executive branch had enjoyed during 
the war was now being carried over to the period of 
reconstruction. Congress chose a reconstruction 
policy of its own as a road back to power. 
Since the reconstruction issue would absorb 
the interest of Congress in December, 1865, the 
5 
Radicals chose this time to unite in open opposition. 
4. J. G. Randall, The Oivil ~ar and Reconstruction. 
D. G. Heath and-rrQmpany, ~ew York, 1937, 371-372, 
813. 
5. Dunning, 42 
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The Republican members of the House held a caucus 
at which they decided to refuse admission to the 
newly chosen southern representatives, and to 
withhold approval of the executive reconstruction 
policy until Congress could decide on one of its 
6 
own. Such a resulution was the call to battle 
between executive and legislature, between the 
Lincoln-Johnson policy of clement reconstruction, 
and the Stevens' theory that the South should be 
punished and humiliated. 
Conditions in the South at this time confirmed 
the Radicals in their punitive policy and drove many 
conservatives into the rival camp. With the libera-
tion of the slaves, it was only natural that responsi-
bilities would be thrown upon the shoulders of many 
a freedman who was not equal to such a burden. For 
to his mind freedom from slave labor meant freedom 
from all labor. Victims of illusions of grandeur, 
the new race, although free, was without status, 
without leadership, without land, without education. 
6. Randall, 722. 
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Vagabondage, then, was the consequence. The 
southern whites, with their fingers on the pulse of 
the social, civil, and political dangers gripping 
the South, rose to meet the situation with the passing 
7 
of the Black Codes which placed numerous limitations 
on the civil liberties of the Negro. ~uch class 
legislation was looked upon by the northern Radicals 
as the circumvention of the results of the war, and 
a disguised attempt to re-enslave the ignorant Negros. 
Determined now to be the champion of the liber-
ated slaves, and realizing the possibilities of the 
colored population in strengthening southern repre-
sentation in the House, the Republican Party decided 
to win the support of the Negroes. They attempted 
to accomplish this by continuing and increasing the 
9 
power of the Freedmen's Bureau. This bureau, 
7. For a summary of these ante-bellum laws cf. 
Randall, 728 
8. Ibid., 724-728 
9. Ibid., 731 
8 
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organized in 1865 as a war-time measure, was to 
be divested of its power one year after the close 
10 
of the war. It was the hope of the Republicans, 
however to continue the organization for two years 
in order to gain enough time to win the support of 
the Negroes and gain control of the South. Therefore, 
to extend the life and power of this bureau a bill 
was introduced and passed in Congress, but only to 
be met by the veto of the President; yet six months 
later it became law when Congress re-passed the bill. 
This piece of legislation did more than merely 
11 
provide for the freedman. Officers of the bureau 
were invested with "sweeping jurisdiction" and their 
power extended over many functions formerly reserved 
to state magistrates. This act, of its very nature 
provided the "obvious evils of patronage and bureau-
cracy and the opportunities for building up a party 
12 
machine" But the most striking provision of tfuis 
10. Commager, Vol. II, 1. 
11. Randall, 731 
12. Ibid. 
39 
bill lay in the establishment of military juris-
diction "under regulations issued through the 
Secretary of War over all cases concerning the 
13 
immunities and rights of freedmen." This was 
usurpation by military courts of civil and criminal 
14 jurisdiction "formerly belonging to the state courts". 
President Johnson vetoed the bill, and critized 
it severly on the score that it was unnecessary, 
unconstitutional and "designed for a state of war 
11 
which no longer existed. Other potent reasons 
for not approving such legislation were that, it 
was far too wasteful at a time when severe retrench-
ment should be the rule, and that it would "coddle 
the Negro to his own detriment", to say nothing of 
the fact that the bill was passed by a Congress which 
16 
had excluded eleven states from its midst. Despite 
the opposition on the part of the President, the bill, 
17 
as noted above, was passed over his veto. 
13. Ibid. 
14. abid • 15. ommager, Vol II, 12-14 
16. Rhodes, Vol V, 571-572 
17. Dunning, 68. 
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'l'his ,unfortunately, was not the only point of 
conflict between the executive and the legislative 
branches, for at the same time Congress intro-
duced and passed the Civil Rights bill which 
declared "Negroes to be citizens of the United 
States", and gave them "rights equal to those 
accorded other citizens, notwithstanding local or 
18 
state laws or ordinances". ~he President, after 
long deliberation, "regretfully" vetoed this bill, 
claiming it to be an "invasion of the rights of the 
19 
states". The breach between the two branches of 
government was now complete, and Congress passed the 
20 
bill over the veto of the President in the con-
viction that they owed protection to the freedmen 
against the black codes, an opinion in which many 
18. Commager, Vol, II, 14-15 
19. Ibid., 15-18 




a northerner concurred. 
After securing the backing of the northern 
people as well as that of Congress, Stevens and 
Sumner began in earnest to further their stern 
reconstruction policy which was insipired by 
personal grievance rather than by the public 
good. 'l'heir first step was to introduce a measure 
which ultimately took shape as the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The amend-
ment contains four sections: (1) it made citizens 
all persons born or naturalized in the United States 
According to Rhodes, the passage of the 
Civil Rights Bill over the President's 
veto "opened a new chapter in the consti-
tutional practice. Since Washington there 
had been many vetoes, but never until now 
had Congress passed over the President's 
veto a measure of importance; and the 
country had been wrought up to the highest 
tension. 1f (Rhoaes - 586.) 
21. Randall, 734-735. 
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22 
and forbade states to abridge their rights; 
(2) it provided for the reduction of the repre-
sentation in Congress of any state that denied 
the vote to any male citizen of voting age except 
those guilty of crime; (3) it disqualified con-
federate leaders from holding political office 
except with the permission of Congress; and (4) it 
23 
prohibited the payment of confederate debts. 
22. This section of the Fourteenth amendment has 
become the crux of many Federal problems. After 
defining citizenship--"All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the States wherein they 
reside,"--then follows the much controverted 
clause-uNo state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property withour-due process of law nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." The scope and purpose 
of this amendment was finally handed down by the 
Federal Supreme Court in 1873 when deciding on 
the constitutionality of the Illinois State 
legislation regarding grain elevators, and the 
Louisianna State legislation regarding slaughter 
houses. (Randall 735-736.) 
23. Commager, Vol. II, 51. 
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The first provision placed the civil rights of the 
Negro under the protection of the Constitution and 
safeguarded them from hostile state legislation. 
The second secured for them the right to vote, and 
the third took the "pardoning power" out of the 
hands of the President. 
This amendment was regarded in the South as 
an insult and every state except Tennessee defeated 
24 
it. Such lack of cooperation incensed the radi-
cally dominated Republican Congress, and they then 
drafted and passed measures supporting a more ex-
treme plan of reconstruction. ~hey secceeded in 
their plans because they had gained a two-thirds 
majority in the Congressional election of 1866, 
which gave them power to over-ride all vetoes, and 
25 
assured them of public backing. 
The program unfolded in the winter of 1866-1867 
consisted of two parts which were developed simultan-
eously. ;,l'he first was devoted to the effective 
assertion of Congressional supremacy over the executive 
24. Dunning, 83 
25. Ibid., 85 
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branch of the government; the second consisted 
in the effective assertion of this supremacy in 
the conquered South.l'he first measure limiting 
the power of the President came in the form of 
the Tenure of Office Act which made it impossible 
for the President to remove from office, without 
consent of the Senate, any civil officer, inclu-
26 
ding members of his own cabinet. Another curtail-
ment was the Command of the Army Act, according to 
which the President was forbidden to issue military 
orders except through the General of the Army; or 
to relieve the General of his command except at 
the General's own request.27 Violations of these 
acts were also declared to be misdemeanors punish-
able by fine and imprisonment. 'J.'his legislation 
was also met by Johnson's veto, but to no avail, 
for Congress was now powerful enough to over-ride 
the veto. 
Congress now turned its attention to the 
South and enacted a group of laws known as the 
Reconstruction Acts, the most important pieces of 
26. Commager, II, 35-36 
27. Ibid., 37-38 
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legislation during the decade after the war. 
The first of these acts declared governments 
of the existing southern states illegal and 
inadequate, and divided the South into five 
military distructs. Over each district a 
commanding general was appointed who should pre-
serve order, and uphold civil officers and civil 
courts, or replace them with military tribunals 
as he wished. Under his direction each state was 
to frame and adopt a new constitution which must 
provide for negro suffrage. Only after Congress 
should approve the constitution, and when a legisla-
ture, elected under its provisions, should adopt 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the state might be re-
28 
admitted to the Union. 
This Act, when regarded from the military and 
the suffrage aspects, leads one to doubt the purity 
of intention of the Republican party. Its leaders 
were determined that the Negro should be enfran-
chised in order to insure themselves a foothold in 
the South, a-foothold from which the Republican 
28. Ibid., For a fuller treatment of the Recon-
struction acts, cf Randall, 753-760. 
46 
party could climb to power. But the military 
character of the Act is even more bewildering. 
On August 20, 1866, the President declared the 
country at peace, and three months later the 
Supreme Court, in the famous Milligan Case, de-
clared all military tribunals unconstitutional 
except where the war made the operation of civil 
29 
courts impossible. Now, however, the Republican 
Congress passed a bill creating military tribunals 
to supplant the civil courts, a "direct and contempt-
30 
uous disregard of the Supreme Court's decision. n 
It would seem, then, that Congress was ready to go 
to any length to insure the adoption of its recon-
struction policy and to organize the South under 
the Republican banner. 
This act was further supplemented by three 
31 
other acts of Congress, two of which were passed 
over the President's veto, while the third became 
29. Cf decision of the Federal Supreme Court ex 
parte Milligan Commager, II, 22-26. 
30. Dunning, 94. 
31. Commager, II, 38-39, 41-42, 49. 
47 
law by the operation of the ten-day rule without 
32 
the President's signature. The cards were 
stacked. The Radicals were now empowered to en-
force their type of government upon the South. 
Their entire plan may be summed up as a plan "to 
put the Negro in power over the white race in all 
33 
the States in the South and to keep him there." 
32. Randall, 760 




1868 - 1870 
Mississippi, like all the other Southern 
States, found herself outside the Union after the 
passage of the Congressional Reconstruation Acts. 
If the conditions for the re-admission had been 
somewhat tempered to meet the situation, the blow 
might have been softened, but such was not the pur-
pose of the northern Radicals who demanded the 
"pound of flesh" instead of mercy. If Congress 
thought that the problems of reconstruction were 
ended with the passage of the acts, it was sadly 
mistaken; they had only begun. 
Conditions in the South caused by this Congress 
can be summed up as follows: The states were declared 
to be outside the Union and their existing State 
governments were declared to be inadequate as well as 
illegal; military rule was imposed upon the "rebels" 
until a satisfactory government could be arranged for 
each state; and, the right of suffrage was conferred 
upon the freedmen, but withheld from a large class 
1 
of whites. 
1. ~4!?n.r..l Steele Commager, Documents of American History, 
F. S. Crofts & Co. New York 1934 Vol. II 30-51. 
48 
49 
Shortly after the enactment of the reconstruc-
tion measures, the President assigned General Ord 
to the command of the fourth military district, 
2 
embracing the states of Mississippi and Arkansas. 
It was the General's duty to maintain order and to 
register the loyalists for the new electorate, and 
since the latter was by far the more important duty, 
it was undertaken at once. Registration boards were 
formed of those who could swear that they had not 
voluntarily borne arms against the United States, 
which automatically eliminated almost all of the 
native shites, "and the posts were subsequently 
filled by freedmen, military officers, and ex-union 
soldiers who had settled in the South after the war". 
These boards, beginning their canvass early in June, 
were empowered to register as legal voters only those 
male citizens who were twenty one years of age and 
who could claim one year residency in the State. By 
law, each applicant had to swear that he had not been 
3 
2. James Wilford Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi, 
The MacMillan Company, New York, 1901, 161. 
3. Ibid., 172. 
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a member of any state legislature, nor held any 
executive or judicial office after which he had 
engaged in rebellion against the United States, 
or given aid or camfort to its enemies; that he 
had never taken an oath as a member of Congress 
or as an officer of the United States, or a~ a 
member of any state legislature or as an executive 
or judicial officer of any state, to support the 
Constitution of the United States, and afterwards 
engaged in insurrection against it, or given aid or 
4 
comfort to its enemies. In effect these stringent 
requirements disqualified most of the prominent and 
influential white citizens, and when the registration 
was completed the Negroes were found to have a ma~ority 
5 
of 20,000. 
This survey of the 'voters revealed, as nothing 
else had done, the real political situation into 
which civil war and reconstruction were fast forcing 
the whites. It was now plain that the management of 
their political affairs, which they had formerly 
4. Commager, 38 
5. Garner, 175 
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looked upon as theirs by right, must soon pass to 
their late slaves, together with strangers from 
the North. Many declared that the state was no 
longer fit for white men, and some even prepared to 
6 
migrate to other states. 
The ground work was completed, and now General 
Ord made plans for an election to determine whether 
the electorate was in favor of a constitutional con-
vention, the preliminary step necessary for the es-
tablishment of civil government and readmission of 
the state to the Union, or whether they preferred 
to remain under military rule and without representa-
tion in Congress. An election to settle this ques-
tion was ordered for the first Tuesday in November, 
1867, and at the same time delegates to the convention 
7 
were to be elected. 
6. It is interesting to note in this connection the 
political status of the negro in the Northern 
States: In only six states was he given the 
right to vote, and any participation in state or 
civil administration was, for the most part, 
simply denied him. But now the North was forcing 
not only negro suffrage, but also negro rule upon 
her sister states. James Ford Rhodes, History of 
the United States, The N~cMillan Company, London, 
1909, Vol, VI, 89. 
7. Garner, 177. 
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Pre-election days say much activity on the 
part of the whites as they earnestly tried to de-
cide upon the most favorable course of action to 
follow during the coming election. Two plans were 
furthered. There were those who thought that the 
government was being re-established on principles 
abhorrent to their traditional ideas of popular 
government, and that those who favored such recon-
struction had little consideration for the welfare of 
the Mississippians. '.L'hey were convinced that the 
best way to show their disapproval was to decline all 
participation in the work of reconstruction and by 
their protest to defeat the reconstruction convention. 
This they could easily do by refusing to vote, be-
cause the approval of a majority of the registered 
voters had to be secured before the convocation of 
8 
such an assembly. 'l'hese men, few in number, main-
tained that Congress had reduced the people to utter 
ruin, and had contriced the perpetuation of negro 
rule, which meant that the Southern States were 
8. Ibid.! 178 
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foredoomed to become African provinces. They 
and their children were to be held in negro sub-
jection. It is to the credit of the Mississippians 
that very few rallied around this standard. 
Another view, entertained by a respectable 
minority of the leading politicians and editors, 
maintained that it was the duty of the whites to 
register, vote for a convention, and in every 
possible way assist in the reconstruction of the 
state. 'l'hey saw clearly that there was no escape 
from negro domination, and that a policy of sullen 
inactivity would increase the predjudices of the 
Radicals in Congress. To accept the reconstruction 
policy as cheerfully as their pride would permit 
could not make their situation any worse, and it 
would perhaps be the means of securing concessions 
from the radicals in Congress. Their support was, 
of course, not outspoken advocacy of the reconstruction 
9 
measures, but mere acquiescence. 
Still another party, the Republican party, came 
9. Ibid., 178-179. 
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into being during these months of reconstruction. 
In September the first Republican convention in the 
state was held at Jackson, and its roster included 
about one third freedmen, and the rest were election 
registrars, bureau agents and Northerners who had 
10 
recently taken up residence in the State. They 
adopted a platform endorsing all the principles of 
the national party and declared that the Mississippi 
Republicans would keep step with it in all the pro-
gressive political reforms of the age. They endorsed 
the congressional plan of reconstruction and promised 
to use their best efforts in extending the benefits 
of free education to every child in the state, and 
to give the ballot to every man not disfranchised 
for crime, including treason; they declared that 
they would never recognize any distinction based on 
11 
race or color. 
10. Ibid., 180 
11. Ibid., 
Support for the newly founded party was 
solicited through the efforts of the secret 
12 
politioal organization, The Loyal League. 
55 
Unsorupulous military authorities and northern 
politicians used this society as a lever by whioh 
they were to bring the entire oolored vote into the 
Republioan party. The organization was introduced 
into the South by the Whigs and ex-soldiers of the 
Union Army. Negro councils were formed, and the 
inorease of membership soon gave the oolored people 
a monopoly of the league in the South. Though the 
majority of the members were Negroes, the League was 
13 
guided in politioal matters by the carpetbag element. 
12. Walter Henry Cook, Secret Societies in the South 
during the period of Reconstruction, Evangelioal 
Publishing House, Uleveland, 17-20. 
13. Dunbar Rowland, History of Mississippi, S. J. 
Clark ~ublishing Company, Chioago, 1925, Vol. II 
143-144. 
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The popularity of this organization was 
due in large measure to the Freedmen Bureau. 
By the use of such instruments it was not hard 
for the Republican leaders to corral the negro 
votes. "It was hhis order, dominated by a few 
radical whites, which organized, disciplined, 
and controlled the ignorant negro masses and 
paralyzed the influence of the conservative 
14 
whites." 'rhe power of this Loyal League knew 
no bounds and its mandates were law to the Negro. 
Death was the extreme punishment for any member 
repeatedly voting the Democratic ticket. All 
candidates were nominated by the League and no 
member could vote for a candidate not endorsed 
by the secret society without incurrihg the wrath 
15 
of the League. 
The Loyal League was a secret, oath-bound 
organization, and its roster embr~ced every male 
14. Walter Lynmood Fleming, The Sequel of Appo-
mattox, Yale University Press, New Haven, 
1921, 175-176. 
15. Cook, 18-19 
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Negro from 18 to 70 years, and every white man 
who would take the oath. While only a few whites 
joined the League, nearly all the male Negroes 
eligible for membership were initiated into its 
16 
mysteries. After the initiation ceremonies, the 
new member was obliged to swear on the holy bible 
the following oath: 
I, •• • , do solemnly swear on the holy 
bible, in the presence of God and these 
witnesses, that I will ever remain true 
and loyal to the Republican party; that I 
will always vote the Republican ticket; 
that I will keep secret all the signs, pass 
words and grip of the Loyal League; that I 
will obey all the laws, rules, resolutions 
and commands of the League of which I am 
a member; that I will forever reverence 
the name and memory of Abraham Lincoln, 
the author and father of my freedom, 
that I will observe and keep holy remembrance 
each anniversary of the Emancipation Brocla-
mation, and that I will teach my children to 
do so •••• 
That I will never knowingly vote for any 
Democrat, for any office, lest I be put 
back into bondage and slavery •••• 
For a violation of this oath, or any part 
of it, for the first offense I agree to 
receive fifty lashes on my bare back, and 
one hundred lashes for the second offense; 
and for the third, to be secretly shot to 
death by any member of the League appointed 
for that purpose. So help me God. l7 
16. Rowland, 144 
17. Ibid. t 145 
58 
Such were the political trends as November 
drew near, and in the election the question was 
decided when the reconstructionists carried the 
state by a large majority. 'J.'he great mass of 
whites took no part in the election, but chose 
to let it go by default. In pursuing this course 
they made a great mistake, one that bore bitter 
fruit in the subsequent months; by their lethargy 
they allowed the Radicals to secure a large majority 
18 
of the delegates in the convention. 
The stage was set and on January 9, 1868, the 
curtain was drawn on the reconstruction convention 
19 
known as the "Black and Tan Convention tt • This 
was the first, and by no means the last, political 
body in Mississippi in which the negro race was 
represented, and a poor representation they made, 
for most of them were without education, and none 
of them had ever held pUblic office. The colored, 
together with the carpetbag element and the white 
republicans, derisively called "Scalawags", by far 
18. Rhodes, 90. 
19. J. G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction, 
D. G. Heath Company, New York, 1937, 790. 
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outnumbered the conservatives, and naturally 
20 
ruled the sessions. 
The keynote of the convention was struck 
by the ohairman in the introductory address in 
whioh he reminded the delegates that the long-
looked for hour had come at last, and that to 
the viotors belonged the spoils. That it was 
not hard to oonvince the assemblage of this fact 
is quite evident for as the first item on the 
agenda was compensation for the oonvention dele-
gates and employees. Excessive salaries were 
agreed upon as if in oonfirmation of their belief 
that they had a legitimate right to exploit the 
taxpayers to any extend they pleased. Of those 
voting for this measure less than twelve were 
owners of property in Mississippi, and therefore 
20. ~hirty two of the sixty one counties of the 
state had negro majority and were given 
seventy delegates, while thetwenty nine white 
counties were given but thirty. II'here were 
seventeen colored delegates, nineteen con-
servatives, twenty from the carpetbag element, 




subject to the tax. But this was not the only 
golden egg that the goose was to lay. Other bills 
were introduced and passed which alloted fabulous 
amounts to individuals and committees for traveling 
expenses, stationery and other such "necessities". 
To defray the enormous expenses incurred by the con-
vention the finance committee was instructed to frame 
an ordinance for levying a tax upon real and personal 
property in the state. Naturally the burden fell 
upon the shoulders of those who received so little 
consideration a~ the hands of the convention - the 
rebel whites, while the so called loyalists hardly 
contributed enough to pay the door-keeper and pages 
22 
of the convention. 
It was inevitable, under the circumstances 
of the situation, that the radical ideas, 
social and economic as well as political, 
should be strongly represented among the 
members of the convention. Southern 
Unionists, in whom rankled the memories 
of long oppression and ostracism, ambitious 
Northerners, filled with ideals of a new 
South modeled on the lines of New England, 
and negroes, less than three years out of 
slavery, ware the classes numerically most 
21. Garner, 189 
22. Ibid., 197 
61 
important in the conventions. Moderation 
was hardly to be anticipated from any of 
these. 23 
Drunk with power, the convention made a bold 
attempt to control all the state offices. by a bill, 
the convention was to be given full power to "declare 
all civil offices vacant" and co-extensive with this, 
the power to make all appointments so that "offices 
24 
might be filled by men of known loyalty." It was 
out and out radicalism the test of loyality. Fortu-
nately the Democrats were able to muster enough 
strength to defeat the measure, but their attempt 
to block such legislation in the future was vehemently 
25 
voted down. 
So engrossed were the rulers of the convention 
in grabbing all they could, that it was several weeks 
before the formation of a state constitution, the 
real work of the convention, was taken up. A committee 
was then appointed to prepare a constitution, and a 
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months before agreement was reached on the disputed 
points. 'lihe main bone of contention concerned 
26 
qualifications for suffrage and office. A strong 
effort was made by the minority to secure the adoption 
of a provision that would exclude from the franchise 
the great mass of the ignorant blacks, but, however 
strong their arguments may have been, they made little 
impression upon the delegates. When the franchise 
article was passed by a large majority, twelve of the 
27 
white delegates withdrew from the convention. 
The franchise article, as finally adopted, re-
quired applicants for registration to subscribe to the 
test oath laid down by the reconstruction act of 
28 
March 23, and swear further that they accepted the 
civil and political equality of all men. Candidacy 
for public offices was restricted to those who had 
neither voted for the secession convention nor in any 
29 
way aided the dause of the confederacy. This was 
26. Randall, 790 
27. Garner, 201 
28. Commager, 38 
29. Garner, 202. 
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meant to be the death warrant of the demooratio 
party. Before adjourning, the oonvention made 
elaborate plans for submitting the oonstitution to 
the people for ratifioation. At the same time pro-
vision was made for the eleotion of state offioers 
as well as members of the legislature and members 
of Congress. A oommittee of five was also appointed 
to whom was granted the authority to enforoe the 
reoonstruotion aots until suoh time as the state 
legislature should assume oontrol. In the event 
that the oonstitution were defeated this oommittee 
30 
was empowered to reassemble the oonvention. 
The program of the oonvention had hardly been 
determined when the friends and opponents of the 
oonstitution began to marshal their foroes for the 
contest that was evidently brewing. ~he republioan 
state oonvention was held and in the nominations the 
oolored raoe was oompletely ignored sinoe all the 
plaoes were taken by Northerners. In loud protest 
against suoh treatment of the ~egroes who oonstituted 
ninty-nine one-hundreths of the republioan votes, a 
30. Ibid., 208 
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well educated negro leader, Rev. Fitz:hugh, urged 
his fellows to join hands with the Southern whites 
and bid defiance to the carpetbaggers. ~uch men, 
he claimed, "garged in the disguise of friends to 
us are imposters ••• " He withdrew from the party 
declaring it to be "ruinious to the Union and an 
31 
enemy of the black." His cry, however, fell on 
deaf ears. 
The Democrats, faced with utter extinction made 
a desperate attempt to unite the whites in opposition 
to the constitution. Nieetings were held until finally 
a unified program was adopted. They denounced the 
radicals and declared that the only hope for the re-
storation of their constitutional rights lay in the 
defeat of the state constitution. A state ticket was 
nominated but only as a matter of form. 'lhey knew 
that their mem would never hold office for if they 
won the election, the constitution would be defeated 
and military rule would continue, and if they lost 
the election, the Republicans would continue to rule. 
The cause of the Democrats was greatly helped as the 
proscriptive character of the constitution became more 
31. Ibid. 208 
65 
generally understood. 
The election of June 22, 1868, brought joy to 
the whites, but consternation and gloom to the radi-
calsj to both parties, in truth, it was a surprise 
32 
for the constitution was overwhelmingly defeated. 
The Republicans moved quickly to save face and to 
have the election declared a Republican victory in 
33 
spite of the election returns. 'I'he committee 
applinted by the convention now became an investi-
gation committee, and after months of feigned investi-
gating, declared that the constitution had been rati-
fied and adopted by the majority of the legal votes 
cast, and that the Republican state ticket was duly 
34 
elected. They were able to make such a decision 
32. "Only in Mississippi was ratification of the new 
constitution defeated by a majority of the votes 
cast." 
William Archibald Dunning, Reconstruction, 
Political and Economis, Harper and Brothers, 
New York, 1907, 118. 
33. The election results showed that the constitution 
was defeated by seven thousand votes, and that 
the Democratic candidates had secured four out 
of the five seats in Congress, and that the 
Democratic Governor had won by an eight thousand 
majority. Garner, 216. 
34. Randall, 791. 
66. 
because they rejected the votes from "white 
counties" on the score that they were the results 
of fraud and intimidation. "The audacity of the 
proclamation shows the desperation to which they 
(the Republicans) were reduced. .There was not a 
shadow of authority for the extraordinary action 
35 
of the committee". 
A Republican convention was quickly assembled 
and a committee appointed to proceed to Washington 
to lay before Congress the problem of Mississippi, 
and urge the reasmission of the state. In all their 
dealinss, it was taken for granted that the state 
constitution was duly ratified. It was not until 
after the inauguration of President Grant in 1869 
that definite action was taken to end the existing 
situation. The Mississippi problem was taken from 
the hands of the state committee and placed in those 
of the National Reconstruction Cownittee. A bona 
fide investigation was then launched and the results 
soon placed in the hands of the President. It was 
35. Garner, 220. 
67 
unanimously agreed that the election had been con-
ducted fairly and that many Negroes had voted vol-
untarily with the whites. It was the opinion of 
the National Co~~ittee that the constitution was 
defeated fairly, and if another were submitted with 
the proscriptive clauses omitted, it would be rati-
fied. ~he president concurred in this opinion and 
Congress authorized the submission of the constitution 
36 
to the popular vote. 
In preparing for the fall election, the politi-
cal parties in Mississippi broke asunder. The Repub-
lican party was now divided into conservative and 
radical elements, with the Negroes for the most part 
adhering to the latter. Separate conventions were 
held and separate platforms adopted expressing the 
two extreme opinions. The outlook of the Democrats 
was anything but encouraging, as it was evident 
that they had not the strength to win the election. 
In a last attempt to defeat the radical program a 
movement was set afoot to unite the Democrats with 
the conservative Republicans. In this arrangement 
lay the salvation of the state, but too many Democrats 
36. Randall, 191. 
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with the conservative Republicans. In this arrange-
ment lay the salvation of the state, but too many 
Decocrats were too proud to join forces and they 
broke from the apron strings of the mother party. 
37 
This was a disastrous mistake. 
In the election on November 30, 1869, the 
constitution was ratified almost unanimously, but 
the so-called proscriptive clauses submitted sepa-
rately were rejected by an overwhelming majority. 
'l'he Republican party made a clean sweep of the 
national as well as the state offices, since the 
colored vote was cast almost solidly for the radical 
program. Throughout the election was controlled 
by the Republicans. In spite of the fact that the 
Republican ticket was backed by the National Adminis-
tration, that a large number of the whites were dis-
38 
franchised-- two potent factors which all but guaran-
teed Republican landslide-- the leaders of the radi-
cal party resorted to underhanded methods to win 
their election. Election laws were deliberately 
37. Garner, 237-244. 
38. It mas been estimated that about 15,OOOv'ihites 
had been disfranchised by the Reconstruction 
Acts. Garner, 246. 
59 
framed to open the way for manipulation and 
fraud; the number of Negroes registered at the 
polls far outnumbered those eli,gible for voting; 
votes were bought and sold; the Democratic vote 
of a Negro was contested; fraudulent votes were 
placed in the ballot boxes before the polls were 
opened; the Republican returning board "juggled 
election returns ••• and in some cases merely esti-
39 
mated what the votes ought to have been". The 
entire election was characterized as a "comedy of 
40 




H. C. Warmoth, War, Politics and Reconstruction, 
225, as quoted by Randall, 848. For other 
election abuses in the Southern States, cf. 
Walter Lynwood Flemming, Documentary History 
of Reconstruction, The Arthur H. Clark Company 
-,-Cleveland, 1907, Vol. II 44-46, 81-93. Though 
the articles listed in this account do not per-
tain explicitly to Mississippi, yet in general 
the methods adopted in one state were likewise 
employed in the others. 
70 
But Congress had at last won the day, much 
against the will of the Mississippians. Bitter 
though the scheme had been, salvation was at last 
in sight, for the state would be admitted to the 
Union, and the people would again have the right 
to hold their own elections. ·J.;he right of self 
government was in sight, but the intervening years 
before Democratic supremacy could be established 
were bitter ones for the white men as well as for 
the Negroes. 
On the 23rd of February, 1870, by act of 
Congress, Mississippi was officially restored to 
41 
the Union and military rule was withdrawn. 
Mississippi had in every way complied with the 
demands of Congress, but in so doing the welfare 
of its citizens was sacrificed to the whims of the 
carpetbaggers. The tree of civil strife was bearing 
bitter fruit. This was CongreSSional Reconstruction. 
41. Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Recon-
struction, 235, 237:-- --- ---
CHAPTER V 
ALCORN AND PffirERS 
Secession and four years of war destroyed 
the government of the Southern States. Two 
years of presidential effort failed to 
restore them. 'J.~hree years of Congressional 
Reconstruction brought into being, by the 
summer of 1870, governments at last acceptfble 
to National authority in all its branches. 
To all intents and purposes, Congress was at 
last satisfied. But the new structure of Mississippi's 
government was built upon ill-will, greed and corruption, 
and no sooner had the finishing touches been given than 
the magnificient edifice began to crumble. 
In truth, there was in the government small 
strength of its own- a few men, white and 
black, who saw in it the hope of a new day; 
many men who saw in it fairer opportunities 
than they had known before of political 
preferment or public plunder; a vast mass 
of ignorant voters, grateful to "the government" 
for what it had done for them, and disposed to 
follow those who could connect themselves with 
the great dispenser of good gifts. 2 
The strength of the reconstructed government came from 
wi thout, not from wi thin. 'l'he Congressional plan waS 
not devoid of weakness, and it was not able to withstand 
the political stress of the next few years. 
1. Robert Selph Henry, The Story Q! Reconstruction, The 




With much ado, General Ames announced the 
results of the fall election: James L. Alcorn 
and his Republican cohorts rode into power on a 
30,000 majority. Accompanying this announcement an 
order was issued making the election effective immed-
iately. But as Governor Alcorn refused to assume 
office until the following March, the time appointed 
by Congress, General Ames called for a provisional 
legislature to meet inJanuary, 1870, to complete once 
and for all the reform required for final restoration. 
The legislative assembly of January 11, 1870, 
was unusual in many respects. In this once Democratic 
controlled state, only seven of the thirty-three senators 
and twenty-five of the one-hundred-and-seven representa-
ti ves were De.ll!lOcrats. '.I.'he remaining seats were filled 
by Republicans of various factions and cliques - Negroes, 
3 
"carpetbaggers" and "scalawags". The "scalawags" 
those native whites who from principle or policy had 
allied themselves with the Republican party - were the 
most abhorred by the people - Governor Alcorn being 
no exception. The "carpetbaggers" - the leeches from 
David H. Donald, The Restoration of Home Rule in 
Mississippi, 1863-1890, M. A. Thesis, University 
of Illinois, 1942, 2. 
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the North who came to bleed the South - were the 
most distrusted.J:he Negroes - slaves of a few 
years back - were most unequal to the authority 
4 
invested in them. These unwelcomed and dreaded 
elements constituted the majority, and they con-
trolled the organization of the legislature, shaped 
the legislation, and established the public policy 
5 
of the state". 
General Ames requested of this assembly in no 
uncertain terms the ratification of the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments - pre-requisites for final 
6 
restoration. No choice was given the delegates 
because by Congressional action slavery had already 
been abolished and the civil rights of the negroes 
guaranteed. The ratification of the amendments, 
4. John Seymore McNeilly, "War and Reconstruction 
in MisSissiSPi 1863-1890" in Mississippi 
Historicalociety Publications: Centenary Series, 
II, 382. 
5. James Wilford Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi, 
The MacMillan Company, New York, 1901, 2700 
6. Ibid, 270-271 
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strangely enough, was sweet revenge for the Demo-
crats. ~hey gloried "in seeing the poisoned 
chalice carried to the lips of those who had forced 
7 
it on the South." Those Northern states, which as 
yet refused to recognize the civil and political 
rights of the Negroes, were made the victims of 
their own scheming. 
The other important accomplishment of the pro-
visional legislature was the appointment of their 
own United States Senators. Governor Alcorn was 
chosen to fill the full term beginning March 4, 1871, 
while General Ames and Rev. Hiram Revels, a negro, 
8 
were chosen for the unexpired terms. The legislature 
could now adjourn and await congressional action. 
Mississippi was now a broken state. Her citizens 
had been forced to swallow their pride and submit to 
negro rule. If this were not enough, Congress demanded 
that every requirement be strictly complied with before 
admission to the Union. The conditions imposed were 
7. McNeilly, 383 
8. John R. Lynch, The Facts of Reconstruction, ~he 
Neale Publishing Company, New York 1913, 44-47. 
75 
like salt on an open wound, but Mississippi 
conformed. Notwithstanding, there were men 
in Congress who demanded still more. These 
men would not accept Mississippi until the 
members of the new legislature had taken the 
9 
oath prescribed in the Virginia Bill. Further-
more, the Butler Bill was introduced which deprived 
Mississippi of equality with the other states in 
the Union, and even went so far as to deny the 
state the right to change its organic law in 
10 
certain respects. For weeks Congress debated, 
and when a more lenient bill failed to please the 
Radicals, the Butler Bill was finally passed in 
utter desperation. On February 23, President 
Grant signed the bill and Mississippi was no longer 
11 
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At long last civil government was restored. 
General Ames, before resigning his command in 
favor of a seat in the United States Senate, 
turned over the reins of the government to Governor 
Alcorn and the state legislature. On March 10, 
1870, the governor was sworn into office before the 
assembled delegates, and in his inaugurial address 
12 
he promised peace and prosperity to the Mississippians. 
How sadly mistaken he was--there waS to be neither 
peace nor prosperity. 
~he delegates to the new state Congress faced 
important and difficult tasks.Lhe state government 
had to be reorganized thoroughly; a new judiciary 
had to be inaugurated, consisting of three Justices 
of the Supreme Court, fifteen Judges of the Circuit 
Court and twenty Chancery court Judges, all of whom 
were to be appointed by the new Governor with the 
13 
consent of the Senate. Needless to say, the lion's 
share of these offices was given to southern men who 
12. Ibid., 277-281 
13. Garner, 283 
77 
were affiliated with the Republican party--in 
14 
other words, to "scalawags". 
Following this adjustment much time waS spent 
in establishing a new public school system which 
would care for the children of both races. The few 
school buildings that remained after the destruction 
of the war were badly in need of repair. The initial 
financial outlay to repair and build schools was 
great, and taxation soared. nut the constitution 
had provided for such an elaborate sohooling system, 
15 
and, of course, the work had to be done. Finally 
action was taken to preserve the oivil rights of the 
Negro. ~he Black Code and the code of 1857 were 
repealed; Negroes were recognized as eligible for 
jury service, and it was declared illegal to discri-
minate against the colored in any public conveyance 
16 
or in any public gathering. 
Though the first session of the new legislature 
lasted over six months, there was not time enough to 
14. Garner, 283. 
15. Lynch, 33-34 
16. Garner, 285-286. 
78 
reorganize the state government. 'l'he second 
session was called for January 3, 1871. 'l'he 
financial report of the first assembly overwhelmed 
the poor taxpayers. Pay and expenses of the legis-
lature that year were over two hundred and fifty 
thousand dollars, considerably more than three times 
the highest figure recorded by any ~-bellum legis-
lature.I ? And this item was considered minor. In 1870 
Mississippi had only six hundred dollars of dependable 
assets in her treasury and nearly eight hundred thousand 
dollars in worthless paper, but this was of no con-
sideration to the over generous legislature. Their 
program of expenditure "would have done credit to a 
18 
commonwealth of assured wealth and prosperitytt. 
For the year 1870, only $436,000 were collected by 
the state treasurer yet the disbursements exceeded the 
19 
million mark. This was a period of economyl January 
3, 1871, saw the beginning of a new legislature. Six 
months had now elapsed, yet the business at hand had 
not changed. An attempt was made to control taxation 
17. Henry, 409. 
18. Dunbar Rowland, History of Mississippi, S. J. 
Clark Publishing Company, Chicago, 1925, Vol. II, 
163. 
19. Ibid., 164 
79 
and to lighten the burden shouldered for the 
most part by the Democrats. l.lthe proposal to 
revise the assessments met with no success be-
cause it was declared unconstitutional and there-
20 
fore abandoned. 
Since the Apportionate Act of Congress entitled 
Mississippi to a sixth representative, a revision of 
the Congressional districts was necessary. Two 
plans were proposed, one to arrange the distriots 
so that all would have a Republioan majority, though 
in two of them the difference would be slight and 
election doubtful. The other to arrange the dis-
tricts so that five would be solidly Republican and 
21 
one Demooratio. The latter plan was adopted in 
order to assure Republican victory in five out of 
the six districts. 
Financial matters were not helped by the new 
legislature, for instead of retrenching,more money 
was appropriated. Higher education received an 
impetus at the cost of over one hundred thousand 
20. Donald, 14. 
210 Lynch, 66-70. 
80 
22 
dollars, while the railroads also received a 
23 
liberal allotment. State taxation to meet the 
expenditures had increased four times over that of 
24 
1869 and was to increase still more. Such in 
brief was the financial legislation. When on May 
3 the legislature adjourned, the Republicans were 
in favor of longer and more frequent sessions, 
declaring that the legislative needs demanded them. 
The Democrats, however, claimed that "the per diem 
25 
method of compensation was the true reason". 
'Ilhe Federal government at this time' was not 
inactive either. Racial disorder in the early part 
of 1871 led the Northerners to doubt the sincerity 
of the Southern Whites. The secret organization, 
22. Rowland, 166 
23. Garner, 288-289. 
24. Flemming, 71 
25. Garner, 289 
81 
26 
the Ku Klux Klan, was "an answer to the Union 
League, a foil to the carpetbaggers and a means of 
27 
suppressing the negro militia." It was unfortu-
nate, though, that the Klan was controlled by nefar-
ious men who resorted to cruel and terrorizing acti-
vities. Had it been properly governed, it could have 
been a fair instrument to protect the whites against 
negro aggression. As it was, however, 
Whatever credit the Klan may have had 
as a champion of the southern white 
was marred by the irresponsible and 28 
unscrupulous methods which it used. 
But to the credit of the South it must be said that 
the Klan by no means had popular support. In Mississ-
ippi the activity of the hooded riders was centered 
along the eastern boarders, and in the other parts 
29 
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D. C. Heath Company, New York, 1937, 854. 
Ibid., 855 
For the activity of the Ku Klux Klan, of Garner, 
338-353. 
82 
boil came to a head in Mississippi on March 6, 
30 
1871, the day of the Meridian riot. Though 
quickly lanced, the soreness remained. The threat 
of recurrence gave the northern radicals and carpet-
baggers an effective tool whereby they tightened 
their control of the South. 
The racial situation was referred to President 
Grant in a somewhat exaggerated report. When he 
concluded that Mississippi, as well as the other 
Southern States, was not able to cope with the problem 
he directed Congress to intervene. Congressional 
action took form in the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 
31 
1871, the third of the so called Enforcement Acts. 
Congress passed the first and second acts of this 
series to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment by guaran-
teeing the right of the negroes to vote and provided 
heavy penalties where anyone "by force, bribery or 
intimidation" should hinder or prevent a citizen 
32 
from fulfilling his duty. The third act 
30. Rowland, 169-172. 
31. Flemming, 123-128 
32. Ibid., 102-111,112-123. 
83 
was directed against the activities of the Ku 
Klux Klan. Its method of operation was declared 
criminal and, severe penalties were levied against 
anyone who would henceforth participate in any Klan 
disturbance. ~he President was given the power to 
suspend the habeas corpus privilege, and the right 
to intervene with federal troops. Thus the death 
knell was sounded for the Klan, and in the middle of 
33 
1871 its existence virtually came to an end. 
Though southern whites agreed that drastic 
action had to be taken, they could not understand 
the manner in which it was done. The Act was passed 
on April 20, 1871, but Congressional investigation 
did not begin until June 8, and was not completed 
34 
until August 4 of the same year. This surely was 
putting the cart before the horse. 
33. Randall, 174. 
34. Rowland, 174. 
84 
Logically the Congressional investigation 
should have preceded the enforcement act, 
the reverse of the order was equivalent 
of hanging first and trying afterwards. 
Logically, after the act was passed, on 
the presumption of guilt of the late 
insurrectionary states, there was no 
reason for the investigation •. Logic, 35 
however, gave way to partisan strife. 
Eleven years after the passage of this act it was 
declared unconstitutional by the United States 
36 
Supreme Court, but before this decision, Mississippi 
had felt the full force of the legislation. 
By the end of 1871 state and federal troops 
succeeded in maintaining good order apart from 
occasional outbursts. It became evident at last 
that the hostility of the people was not directed 
against the Federal Administration, but the state 
government. Even in Washington the fair minded 
Republicans began to see through the smoke screen. 
35. John S. McNeilly, "Enforcement Act of 1871 and 
the Klu Klux Klan in Miss. ii in the Miss. Hist. 
Soc. Publications XVIII, 109-171 
36. James OE'ord Rhodes, History of the United States J 
The MacNI.illan Company, London, 1909, Vol. VI, 316. 
The light was breaking upon the Republican 
leaders whose souls were not steeped in 
partisan passions, and they were commencing 
to see that the Southern States ridden by 
carpetbaggers and ignorant negroes, were 
rebelling against intolerable state rule 
rather than against the government of the 
United States. 37 
The growing discontent among the northerners came 
85 
to a climax with the congressional debacle. Political 
pressure was brought to bear upon President Grant and 
he promptly asked Congress on December 4, 1871 to 
remove, with a few exceptions, the disabilities im-
posed by the fourteenth amendment. 
Congress would have complied with the wishes of 
the Chief Executive had it not been for the radical 
Sumner, who agitated against the Amnesty bill. 'l'he 
Bill, as submitted, was rejected because of the~vil 
Rights rider tacked on by Sumner. In January 1872 
it was again proposed, and rejected for the same 
reason. It was not until the ~my session that the 
bill was submitted without the odius amendment, and 
38 
it was passed immediately by an almost unanimous vote. 
37. Rowland, 175. 
38. Rhodes, 325-329. 
86 
The Anmesty Act of 1872 is a bright light in the 
reconstruction legislation of Congress and marks an 
advance toward a sounder policy than that which had 
prevailed. It provided: 
'llhat all political disabilities imposed by 
the third section of the fourteenth article 
of amendment of the constitution of the 
United States are hereby removed from all 
persons whomsoever, except Senators and 
Representatives of the 36th and 37th 
Congresses, officers in the judicial, 
military and naval service of the United 
States, heads of departments, and foreigh 
ministers of the United States. 39 
Before this act, over 150,000 Southern whites had 
been excluded from state and federal offices; the 
40 
Amnesty Bill reduced that number to less than 500. 
Though these figures embrace all the confederate 
states, nevertheless they shed an important light on 
Mississippi's politics. 
Prior to the passage of the Amnesty Act, James 
Alcorn had resigned as governor of Mississippi to 
serve as United State Senator. Ridgely C. Powers, 
then lieutenant governor, piloted the ship for the 
39. Flemming, 431. 
40. Rhodes, 329. 
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three remaining years. He assumed oontrol on 
November 30, 1871. It has been said of him that 
of all the oarpetbaggers in Mississippi he was 
41 
"the most popular and most respeoted tt • His task 
was a diffioult one, and though he was a perfeotly 
honest and just man, nevertheless he was walled in 
on every side by oorruption. ~he State Congress at 
this time was busily engaged in promoting oostly 
railroad plans. The pages of its journal are marred 
also by the Printing Bill of 1872, both examples of 
42 
greed and open fraudo 
The eleotion of 1872, however, manifested the 
sinoerity of the new Governor. ihe popular vote for 
the presidenoy gave Grant a 35,000 majority, and the 
Republioans swept all the representative offioes 
exoept one. Luoius Q. C. Lamar, a Demoorat, was 
43 
eleoted to the United States Consress by a 5,000 major~ty 
41. Rowland, 176. 
42. Donald, 27-29. 
43. Rowland, 178. 
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At the time of the election, Lamar was not eligible 
for the office, since he was a former member of the 
Congress of the U. S. and the Confederate States, 
colonel in the Confederate Army, and diplomatic 
representative of the Confederacy abroad. Neverthe-
less Governor Powers and other Republican leaders 
petitioned Congress to reinstate Colonel Lamar by 
having his political disabilities removed. The quali-
fications established by the Fourteenth Amendment were 
set aside in his regard by a special act of congress 
44 
and Lamar was seated without objection. 
The year 1873 brought to Mississippi a long and 
bitter political campaign. The November election was 
to determine the incumbents of State, district and 
county offices. 'l'he beginning of trouble came when 
the constitutionality of the November election was 
contested. The Attorney General of :Mississippi claimed 
that since the state Was not admitted to the Union 
until February, 1870, and since the tenure of office 
was four years, the general election was not due until 
44. Henry, 472. 
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November 1874. Governor Powers addressed a 
special session of congress to this effect, but 
the delegates decided that the first political year 
after the reconstruction was inaugurated by the 
provisional legislature of January 1870. This meant 
that the election of state officials for 1874 was to 
be held in November, 1873. rI'he State Supreme Court 
45 
upheld this decision. 
The battle field was dominated by two staunch 
Republicans, the former military Governor, General 
Ames, and ex-governor Alcorn, the former a carpet-
bagger, the latter a scalawag. Both men represented 
Mississippi in the United States Senate and jealousy 
kept them at arms length. Both claimed the headship 
of the Republican state party and both sought its 
nomination for the governorship. The pendulum swung 
in favor of General Ames and with great ease he se-
cured the nomination at the state convention. Alcorn 
and his colleagues immediately bolted the party and 
46 
nominated a state ticket of their own. Both candi-
dates knew that the door to the governor's mansion 
45. Rowland, 180. 
46. Garner, 290-292. 
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hinged on the negro vote. Each ticket, consequently, 
included three negroe rivals for the same offices-
that of Lieutenant governor, Secretary of State and 
47 
Superintendant of Education. This colored element 
felt that they were not properly represented and 
demanded what was later to be known as the "color line". 
Numerically they were strong enough to enforce their 
demands, but unfortunately competent men could not be 
found to accept the nomination. 'l.'he outstanding ex-
ample of their rashness was to replace the competent 
Superintendent of Education by a colored man "whose 
48 
chief qualification was the color of his skin." 
'l'he Democrats were still too weak to offer much 
opposition. At the state convention held at Meridian, 
it was deemed inexpedient to nominate a ticket of 
their own, and after much deliberation, the majority 
chose to support Alcorn, the lesser of two evils, 
but contrary to expectation, Alcorn lost popularity 
because of Democratic endorsement. 
47. Lynch, 70-76. 
48. Garner, 293. 
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Thousands of Republicans who were in 
sympathy with the movement, and who 
would have otherwise voted the Alcorn 
ticket, refused to do so for the reason 
that if it were elected the Democrats 49 
could claim a victory for their party. 
Nor did all the Democrats ooncur in the decision of 
the convention. Many of that party refused to vote 
for any Republican, while others, dissatisfied with 
Alcorn's middle-of-the-road policy, cast their vote 
for Ames. 
The election went in favor of General Ames, 
who received almost the unanimous vote of the Negroes 
because as military governor he had befriended them. 
This support secured for him a majority of almost 
20,000. Of the governor elect it was said: 
Neither in character nor in debate was 
Ames a match for Alcorn, but the 
results was a forcible demonstration 
of the power of the radical machine 
which was then so solidified and 
ruthlessly managed. 50 
The Governor-elect had as a working partner a Republican 
dominated legislature for the party was able to main-
tain its two to one majority because it controlled the 
negro votea. In the Senate, the Negroes held one fifth 
49. G¥nch, 76 
50. Rowland, 179. 
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of the seats, while in the House they held one 
51 
half. This was just the beginning of the carpet-
bag regime which was to dominate Mississippi until 
the Revolution of 18750 
51. Henry, 503 
CHAPTER VI 
THE CARPET-BAG REGIME 
1874 - 1875 
January 22, 1874, saw the inauguration of 
IVlississippi 's new governor. Governor Ames in his 
address to the new delegates, pledged "retrench-
1 
ment in expenditures and rigid economy". His evi-
dent sincerity won for him the support of a large 
number who had formerly looked upon him as nothing 
more than a "damned yankee". Though he promised to do 
all in his power to reform the abuses existing in 
every branch of the state and county government, what 
he did not stop to consider was the temper of the new 
legislature, which has been described as Uthe culmi-
2 
nation of negro representation". Lieutenant Governor 
A. K. Davis, a Negro, presided over the senate, and 
L. D. bhadd, also a negro, was chosen speaker of the 
house. The Republicans enjoyed a majority, and fore-
most in their minds was financial compensation and 
personal aggrandizement. It was they who were to set 
10 Dunbar Rowland, Encylopedia of Mississippi History, 
Southern Historical Publication Association, Atlanta, 
1907, Vol. I, 86. 
2. Dunbar Rowland, History of Mississippi, S. J. Clark 
Publishing Company, Chicago, 1925, Vol. II, 181. 
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the tempo of legislation and thereby nullify 
the good will of the Governor. 
Governor Ames drew up a wise and practical 
plan whereby state expenditures would be curtailed 
and state taxation would be reduced in proportion 
to the ability of the people to pay. He advocated 
retrenchment in every branch of the government, 
and he insisted especially that the cost of the 
legislature be reduced. At that time the average 
cost per day of that body was $1,800, and the 
annual sessions cost the state over ~100,000. 
Governor Ames urged a reduction in the per diem 
rate, and, in place of the semi-annual sessions, 
he urged bi-ennial sessions. This proposal so 
effected the pocket book of the legislators, with 
the result that "the legislature to which these 
recommendations were addressed did not seem to 
3 
favor reform". 
Instead of retrenchment, excessive disburse-
ments were the immediate result. To meet their 
needs, taxes were increased until they reached 
3. James Wilford Garner, Reconstruction in Iviississipp , 
The MacMillan Company,New York, 1901, 296-297. 
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the highest ever to be levied in the state of 
Mississippi. In 1874, taxation was fourteen 
4 
times as great as it was in 1869. In protest 
to the heavy burden of taxes, the citizens formed 
the State Grange and the Taxpayers' League whose 
avowed purpose was to secure "equal and moderate 
taxation; economical and lawful expenditures of the 
5 
public funds." 'l'hese organizations grew apace with 
increased taxation and proved to be deciding factors 
in the final overthrow of the greedy carpetbaggers. 
The former organization at the state convention 
held in January, 1874, resolved that: 
4. Walter Lynwood Flemming, Documentary History 
of Reconstruction, The Arthure H. Clark Company, 
Cleveland, 1907, Vol. II, 71. 
5. John Seymore McNeilly, "War and Reconstruction 
in Mississippi, 1863-1890", in Mississippi Histori-
cal Society, Publications: Centenary Series, 
II, 453. 
Taxation in Mississippi has become a 
burden so large and excessive that 
96 
the vital energies and industries of our 
state are becoming sapped, paralyzed and 
destroyed, and ruin inevitable and irre-
trievable stares us in the face. 6 
At the taxpayers' convention, December 2, 1874, 
a protest was drafted and sent to the legislature 
wherein it was noted: 
A careful estimate shows that during these 
years of increasing and most extravagant 
tax-levies, the public debt was increased 
on an average annually over $664,000, a sum 
sufficient to defray the entire expenses of 
the government, economically administered. 
That is, the state spent on an average this 
large sum each year, over and above the 
amount c~llected on those monstrous tax-
levies. 
These organized movements and formal protests, 
however, had little effect upon the state legislature. 
Expenditures continued to increase, the most out-
standing of which were the $132,000 allotted to the 
penitentiary, $82,000 for public printing, $153,000 
for the lunatic asylum, $300,000 for education, and 
8 
~117,380 for the legislature of that year. 
6. Rowland, Enc;2:10Eedia of MississiE12i HistorI, 
88-89. 
7. Flemming, 71. 
8. Rowland, Enc:lloEedia of Mississi1212i HistorI, 93. 
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Finances, unfortunately, was not the only 
major complaint against the misrule. V'lhen 
Governor Ames determined to seek the gubernatorial 
office, it was his desire to later resign the honor 
and to resume his place in the United States Senate. 
His plan was thwarted by the election of A. K. Davis, 
a negro, as Lieutenant Governor, and good sense 
and practical judgment prevented him from abandon-
ing the administration into the hands of such a 
man. Even so, Davis made every attempt to control 
the government and assumed full authority the 
.moment Governor Ames went North on vacation. 
Twice in 1874 Davis seized such an opportunity 
to act, and both times he "indulged in grotesque 
extravagance and corrupt practices that fitly pre-
luded the close of this dark chapter of the State's 
9 
history". Shortly after adjournment of the legis-
lature in Spring, 1874, when Davis for the first 
time assumed control, his first act was to dis-
charge the governor's private secretary, and then 
many of the employees of the government in order 
9. Ibid. , 
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to accommodate his own friends. In positive 
disregard of the appointments made by Governor 
Ames, Davis made his own appointments of Chancellors 
for several districts. He did not stop here. He 
issued sixty-five pardons to his colored friends 
in less than three months in which he enjoyed 
10 
authority. That Governor Ames should place his 
people at the mercy of the vicious and corrupt 
negro, was appalling to all good citizens, and led 
them to doubt the sincerity of the man they had 
trusted. 
This was not the only instance in which Governor 
Ames betrayed the trust of his people. His deter-
mined action in regard to the judiciary was criti-
cised by friend and foe alike. ;l;he Judiciary of 
Mississippi was made up of twenty circuit judges 
and as many chancellors, the former holding office 
for a period of six years, the latter for four, 
by virtue of appointment by the Governor with the 
consent of the senate. Governor Alcorn had made 
these appointments in 1870, consequently by the 
10. Garner, 298-299. 
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spring of 1874 the offices of the chancellors would 
be vacated and new appointments would be in order. 
Governor Ames refrained from nominating their suc-
cessors until after the adjournment of the senate, 
and by so doing, those whom he eventually appointed, 
held office by virtue of the Governorts consent alone. 
Since he was solely responsible for their appointment, 
he could likewise remove them from office'without the 
consent of the senate. 'J.'his was an effectual means 
of controlling the judiciary, of making it subser-
vient to his own will,and thereby destroying its 
11 
independence. 
There are two outstanding cases in which Governor 
Ames used his power to control court decisions. 'J.'he 
first instance was that of A. T. Morgan, a personal 
'. 
friend of the governor, who charged with murder and 
arraigned before a chancellor, was committed to jail 
and held without bail. 'rhis was not in accord with 
the governorts wishes. Ames straightway dismissed 
the chancellor, as he oOuld do this since the appoint-
ment had not been confirmed by the senate, and appointed 
11. Ibid., 299-300 
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another man to fill the vacancy. Morgan waS 
12 
forthwith released on bail. The second in-
stance was just as outstanding. Uhancellor 
Pe1ton held office without confirmation, and when 
he rendered a decision at variance with the gover-
nor's wishes, Ames refused to submit his name to 
the senate foT confirmation, though Peyton had held 
13 
office for almost a year. 
By far tne most serious and well founded charge 
ag~inst the governor in regard to the judiciary was 
the appointment of incompetent men to judicial posi-
tions • Some appointees were not even members of the 
ba~ and were ignorant of both law and practice. One 
suoh person was so notoriously unfit for the position, 
th~t the senate refused to confirm his appointment 14 
even though he waS a member of their party. 
In all appointments Governor Ames waS guided 
by partisansb.iP, which more than restricted his 
choice. In a.. state, where the bar was dominated 
al.r:JlOst entirely by Democrat s, few others could be 
fol.-lnd to fiLL the role of Judge. His choice was 
Ibid., ~01-302 
Ibid., 302. 
I"bIQ:' • 3 04. 
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further limited by his refusal to appoint anyone 
who might have any connection with the Alcorn wing 
15 
of the party. At a time when the office of chan-
cellor needed men of judicial training and integrity 
because of its important and extensive jurisdiction, 
failure to meet the requirements reflected badly 
16 
upon the administration. 
The tune of the carpetbaggers was soon being 
whistled by the Negroes. As the former sought their 
"pennies from heaven" in the more prominent state 
offices, the latter were content to make the most of 
the county offices. Of the seventy three counties in 
Mississippi in 1874, thirty four had a Republican 
administration, and many of these were governed only 
17 
by Negroes. 'l'he office most coveted was that of 
sheriff, because it offered the greatest opportunity 
for pecuniary gain, and at the same time wielded the 
most power. The compensation for this office was, on 
an average, $5,000, but it waS not uncommon for the 
15. Ibid., 304 
16. Ibid., 
17. Rowland, History of Mississippi, 183. 
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fee to soar as high as $20,000 through bribes and 
18 
illegal transactions. In the Republican con-
trolled counties this office was filled by white 
carpetbaggers, but where the colored voters main-
tained a majority, one of their own was elected. 
In some cases the sheriff was sheriff in name only 
because he had neither the ability nor the knowledge 
to administer the office. Under such circumstances, 
19 
the office was farmed out and the emoluments shared. 
In these same counties the important office of 
Justice of the Peace and the boards of supervisors 
were filled by the unwanted element. The former was 
a law unto himself in the numberless cases of petty 
offences; the latter were responsible for the rebuild-
20 
ing of the wasted buildings, bridges and land. It 
was the county boards who controlled the assessment 
and disbursement of taxes, supervised the roads, se-
lected juries, awarded county contracts, examined and 
determined upon the sufficiency of official bonds, 
18. Ibid., 182 
19. Garner, 306. 
20. Rowland, Encylopedia History of lvlississippi, 87. 
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21 
and negotiated loans. These positions of so 
great importance should have been administered 
by men of unusual business ability, but instead, 
they fell into the hands of the incompetent Negroes 
22 
who were guided by the Republican machine. 
To meet the expenditures of the counties, the 
people were taxed to the extreme in both Democratic 
and Republican controlled districts. Mississippi 
had been impoverished by the war, its crops ruined 
or damaged by floods and droughts, so that many men 
were not able to meet the financial assessments. In 
many cases the taxpayers were forced to yield their 
property to confiscation: 
Over six million acres of land - one-fifth 
of the area of the state - were forfeited 
during this period, on account of the 23 
inability of owners to pay the taxes. 
As the burden had to be shouldered almost entirely by 
the whites, this was an added grievance. Almost one 
half of the voters in 1874 were free from taxation 
because they owned no real estate at that time. The 
21. Garner, 307. 
22. Rowland, Encylopedia History of Mississippi, 88 
23. Garner, 312-313. 
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Negroes, especially, were for the most part tax 
eocempt. Many If those who shared in the honor 
and wealth of the lucrative state and county 
offices contributed nothing to their own support. 
There were many counties in which the blacks 
did not pay $1,909 in taxes, yet they held 
the majority of the offices and administered 
the government. 24 
What was true of the counties was also true of 
the state. 'l'he Republican controlled legislature 
was bitterly resented, not so much because of what 
it was, but because of what it did~ In five years 
there had been nine sessions of the legislature con-
trary to the pledge of the Republican party. Instead 
of bi-ennial sessions promised, the legislature met 
semi-annually, a practice which cost the state over 
25 
$100,000 a year. The effort of the taxpayers' 
league to introduce be-ennial sessions was blocked 
by the colored vote. As a compromise, however, the 
delegates voted to limit the compensation to $500 a 
year instead of the perdiem rate of $7.00 and 80t 
24. Ibid., 314 
25. Ibid., 325 
105. 
per "mile traveling expense. This allowance was 
still fantastic when compared with the compensation 
26 
granted in the northern states. 
'l'he time for a showdown had come, and the men 
of Vicksburg were the first to act. Vicksburg and 
Warren County were dominated by Negroes and into 
their hands fell the majority of the political of-
fices. ~hese illiterate officials were mere 
ftsatelites" under the control of corrupt and scheming 
27 
men. Vicksburg especially was subjected to the 
"corrupt and incompetent" administration. 
The senators and representatives in the 
legislature were colored, the sheriff could 
not write a simple return and he was be-
lieved to be dishonest; the chancery clerk 
was corrupt beyond doubt, and not intelligent 
enough to enter a plain continuance on tbe 
records; ,the circuit clerk and every member 
of the board of supervisors except one were 
colored, and scarce one of them could read 
or write; and four of the eight councilmen of 
Vicksburg were colored. In fact, there w~re 
only three white officers in the county.2 
26. Ibid., footnote 
27. Robert Selph Henry, The Story of Reconstruction, 
'rhe Bobbs-Merrill Company, New York, 1938, 542. 
28. Garner, 3280 
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The city government was sustained politically 
by appeals, on the color line, to the non 
tax-paying negroes, and supported financially 
by tax-paying ~hites. 29 
'lihe resources of the whites were drained by the 
heavy taxation which had increased during the 
Reconstruction period from ~13,000 to ~lJ400,000J 
30 
and this in a city of only 11,000. Ninety-nine 
percent of the taxes were paid by the whites while 
the taxes were "assessed, collected and disbursed 
31 
by colored officials." 
Determined to put an end to the outrages once 
and for all, the whites organized a tax-payers league 
whose avowed purpose was to win the city election in 
the fall of 1874. The taxpayers who nominated re-
sponsible men under the name of the People's party, 
were whole-heartedly supported by all the whites, 
carpetbaggers and scalawags alike, and even by a 
32 
few Negroes. Although the Republicans for their 
part nominated a white man for mayor, a worse choice 
could hardly have been made. '.L'his nominee at the 
33 
time was under indictment for twenty three offences. 
29. Henry, 529. 
30. Ibid., 
31. Garner, 328 
32. Henry, 519-520. 
33. Rowland, History of 
Mississippi, 186. 
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~he remainder of the ticket was equally bad. Of 
eight candidates for aldermen, they nominated 
seven Negroes, while six of the eight school trustees, 
and the city marshal were likewise colored. 'l'he 
whites representing the ticket were of the "rank 
carpetbag variety." Such a ticket was revolting 
34 
to even hardened Republicans. ~he ticket was 
so objectionable that eventually "but three white 
35 
men in the city voted for it". The die was cast 
and the August election was to be the acid test of 
strength between the contending parties. 
Weeks before the polls were opened, Vicksburg 
lived in deadly fear of a riot. White and black 
militia made themselves very much in evidence, but 
cool judgment kept them from acts of violence and 
blood shed. Governor Ames at this time was enjoy-
ing the cool breezes of the East Coast, and 
Lieutenant Governor Davis who was faced with the 
problem petitioned the United States Government 
for troops, but was refused. Governor Ames upon 
34. Ibid. , 
35. Garner, 329. 
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his return renewed the petition, but to no 
avail. His second appeal received the same 
reply. '.L'he administration was left to its own 
poor resources. 
Nothing illustrates better the imbecility 
of the state government than the fact 
that within three months after its in-
auguration it is found calling for United 
States troops to maintain th56peace in a town of 11,000 inhabitants. 
The election of August 4 was "exciting but peace-
able", and the reform ticket was elected almost t,o 
37 
'tIhe man. 
The election proved one point conclusively: 
the strength of the negro rule rested upon federal 
support, and once this was removed the regime would 
crumble. 'J.'he important lesson was never to be for-
gotten in Mississippi, and it was the sole reason 
why race riots were not the order of the day. 
Logically they figured that riots would bring 
federal troops and federal troops would prolong 
the misrule; consequently they did all that was 
38 
within their power to avoid acts of violence. 
36. ~., 
37. Henry, 530. 
38. Rowland,History: of Mississippi, 187. 
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Before this lesson was learned by the 
majorlty, however, there was trouble in Vicksburg 
and Warren county. The Reformers of the city 
government would not rest satisfied until the 
county offices were also purged. Their immediate 
attention was drawn to the most important office 
in the county, the sheriff. Investigation showed 
the extent of the corruption. Bonds that had been 
posted were ridiculously insufficient; fraudulent 
jury and witness certificates abounded; cQunty 
warrents had been forged and circulated, and em-
39 
bezzlement were outstanding. Before the defen-
dants could be brought to court, evidence against 
them was stolen from the court house. but waS 
later found hidden away in the house of the chancery 
40 
clerk. 
The taxpayers gathered in December to deter-
mine a course of action. Taxes amounting to 
$160,000 were due and were to be collected by 
Crosby, and they demanded his resignation and that 
39. Garner, 332. 
40. Henry, 530. 
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of the chancery clerk coroner, and other county 
41 
officials. When Crosby refused to resign, he 
was at once confronted by a mob of five hundred 
who forcibly secured his resignation. Crosby 
protested and fled to Jackson to enlist the aid of 
the Governor. A white man was immediately appointed 
to fill the vacated office, and business continued. 
Governor Ames declared the resignation null and void 
and promised to reinstate Crosby by state troops if 
42 
nec.essary. and subsequently issued a proclamation 
stating: 
That riotous and disorderly persons had 
combined to deprive colored men in 
Vicksburg of their civil and political 
rights. All such persons were warned 
to disperse immediately. 43 
The Negro militia was ordered by the governor to 
accompany Crosby to Vicksburg, to reinstate him and 
to supress the riot. No appeal was made to the white 
militia which was then in the city; in fact the com-
mander of the negro unit, though of inferior rank, was 
44 
directed not to take orders from white officers. 
41. Ibid. , 
42. Garner, 332-333 
43. Ibid., 333 
44. Ibid., 
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Crosby was intent upon regaining his office 
and feared that the negro militia would be too 
weak to enforce the will of the governor, so 
circulars signed by him were distributed throughout 
45 
the country, and appeals were made for negro sup-
port in all the country churches. 'l'he march on 
Vicksburg had begun..rne armed mob appeared outside 
of the city on Monday, December ?, but the citizens 
were not unprepared. Martial law had been declared 
by the Mayor and the supreme command delegated to an 
46 
ex-Confederate officer. An attempt was made to 
settle the dispute without bloodshed. 'l'he leaders 
met in a parley and the Negroes agreed to withdraw. 
Nobody knows why, but firing began on both sides. 
In the riot that followed two whites and a score of 
Negroes were killed. Crosby, the ultimate cause of 
the riotous gathering, deserted his followers when 
4? 
the shooting began. 'i.'his was the Vicksburg riot. 
45. Although Crosby denied writing such a proclamation, 
it was later discovered that the circular was 
written for him by a clerk in the office of the 
Secretary of State. Rowland, History of l~lississipp , 
189. 
46. Garner, 334. 
4? Henry, 531; Garner, 328-334; Rowland, 185-190. 
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The riot, however, was short lived. After 
December 7 there were no more hostilities, and 
peace was restored. Nevertheless, the Governor 
continued his demands for federal aid, and when 
his requests were constantly refused, he called a 
special session of the legislature to investigate 
racial condition. A joint resolution was introduced 
which disregarded the power of the governor, and 
petitioned the President for troops to nsuppress 
domestic violences and restore peace in the state". 
48 
'l'he resolut ion was passed by the Republican .rna jori ty, 
while the minority vigorously opposed it, protesting 
that it was a Republican ruse to introduce martial 
49 
law in the state for political purposes. Protest, 
however, was useless. On January 5, troops dispatched 
from New Orleans by General Sheridan, marched on 
Vicksburg and ousted the sheriff chosen at a special 
50 
election and reinstated Crosby. Though the attempt 
to purge the government was futile, nevertheless the 
lessons learned were the A,B,C's of ultimate victory. 
48. Rowland, History of lvlississippi, 191 
49. Garner, 335 
50. Henry 542. 
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The regular session of the state legislature 
was scheduled to convene on the 5th of January 1875. 
Knowing tllis, the taxpayers from fifth-two counties 
gathered at Jackson on the 4th to adopt resolutions 
51 
to be submitted to the legislature. Arter listing 
in detail the grievances of the taxpayers, their 
protest concluded: 
Our present appeal amounts to this -
shall the few officials, the mere servants 
of the people, be permitted to fatten and 
grow richer, whilst the people grow poorer 
and starve? Shall these public servants 
be privileged to enjoy an extravagant waste 
of money of the people, to the destruction 
of the property of the state, or will the 
legislature interpose immediately, and by 
vigorous system of wise reforms enforce 
rigid economy of expenditures in all depart-
ments of the government - legislative, 
executive and judicial~ in counties, cities, 
towns,and districts? 5~ 
The legislature convened on January 5 and 
remained in session until April 6, 1875. Its 
answers to the demands of the taxpayers were a 
series of bills more burdensome than ever before 
to the anemic taxpayers. 
51. Rowland, History of 1'lississippi, 191 
52. Ibid., 193 
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Governor Ames and his tribe were to have 
one more fling before the native forces 
of law, order, and decency were to 
drive them from the state. 53 
The first of the series was the District Printing 
Bill passed by the reco~nendation of the Governor, 
by which the governor aimed "to support a partisan 
54 
press and control it in his interests". The 
Pearl River Bill, signed by the governor, was still 
55 
more odius because of the swindle it embraced. 
Still another was a bill empowering the governor to 
appoint connty tax collectors, a function heretofor 
reserved to the sheriff, and hence controlled to 
some extent by county vote. This new bill removed 
popular control and placed the appointing power in 
56 
the hands of the governor. The State Supreme 
Court declared this law to be unconstitutional, and 
thus saved the state from the abuses that would 
na turally have followed. 'lihe Iv:Letropoli tan Police 
Bill, still another in the series, conferred upon 
the governor the power to maintain a militia to 
53. Ibid., 193 
54. Garner, 325, 326 
55. Ibid., 326-327 
56. Ibid., 327 
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police the state. It also gave him absolute 
control over the police system in Viarren Co~nty 
and Vicksburg. For this he was granted $2,000,000 
for the state militia and $200,000 for his "Warren 
57 
County Police Force". Another measure legislated 
for the appointment of special revenues inspectors 
for each district. This should have provided for 
honest collections and returns, but in reality it 
was a measure to provide for the "hangers-on" of 
58 
the administration. Tne last and perhaps the 
greatest abuse of the legislature was authorizing 
the lease of state convicts to its own members 
without compensation to the state, though the con-
victs were subsequently sub-leased for a large sum. 
'The appropriation of the legislature was some-
what reduced in comparison to former sessions, but 
this was accomplished only by the defeat of the 
60 
Police Bill. Such legislation proved to be the 
straw that broke the cfu'llel f s back. 
57. Rowland, History of lV.lississippi, 193 
58. Ibid., 194 




DElv10CRATIC HOlVIE RULE 
1876 
The year 1875 opened with an active protest 
against Republican rule. The Taxpayers' Conven-
tion held early in January of that year was an 
organized effort to unite all men, white and 
colored, Democrats and Republicans, in opposition 
to the ever increasing rates of taxation. At\the 
outset this organization was not political, but as 
the November election approached the members had no 
alternative but to unite with the Democratic party 
whose platform enunciated the very principles for 
which they were fighting. The election of 1873 
proved conclusively that the so called Conservative 
party, which had appealed to all whites irrespective 
of political affiliations, was dead. The overwhelming 
Republican victory in that year smothered all hope of 
reorganization. It became clear, then, that if the 
Republican party was to meet with any opposition, 
that opposition must come from the Democratic party. 
VVith the advent of the Republican party in 1862, 
and their immediate rise to power, the Democratic 
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party was virtually crushed. It was so disorgan-
ized that in 1873 they deemed it inexpedient to 
nominate their own ticket. Not now all that was 
past; and they faced a new crisis, to save Mississippi 
1 
from the rule of the Republicans. 
ts early as ~~rch 3 the initial step was taken 
to unify all opposition. On that day the reorgani-
zation of the Democratic party was entrusted to 
2 
John M. Stone and a committee of forty-two members, 
to whom fell the onerous task of preparing for the 
state convention to be held at Jackson, on August 3. 
'l'he hopes of the leaders were high, because of 
Democratic victories in the North which returned a 
Democratic majority to the House of Representatives. 
Conditions in the state, likewise, were encouraging, 
for internal disputes were rending the Republican 
party, and, though that party claimed to embrace 
twenty-five or thrity percent of the Mississippi's 
3 
whites, it was evident that, unless there were 
1. James Wilford Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi, 
'Iihe MacMillan Company, New York, 1901, 372 
2. Ibid. 
3. John R. Lynch, The Facts of Reconstruction, The 
Neale Publishing-rrompany,~ew York, 1913, 106. 
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drastic changes in the Radical policy, these votes 
could easily be won by the Democrats. 
That the Republican party was fast coming 
under the control of the negro element, the politics 
of Warren county gave ample proof and warning. The 
adoption of the "colored line" in many counties 
forced white men to desert the Republican fold for 
the Democrats, a clear example of which was in the 
defeat of the Metropolitan Police Bill, When the 
Bill was introduced in the Senate after its passage 
by the house, the white Republicans joined with the 
Democrats to bring about its defeat. 
'lihis defeat may be said to symbolize the 
failure of the Ames administration, for 
besides depriving the governor of a 
powerful weapon in combating white 
guerrilla tactics, it showed that when 
the color-line was drawn party loyalties 
were forgotten. 4 
With this in mind, the Democrats met at Jackson 
prepared to do all that was possible to unite both 
races ttin a determined effort to secure the blessings 
of an honest, economical government administered by 
4. David H. Donald, The Restoration of Home Rule in 




able, efficient, and competent public officers". 
6 
The platform adopted was of such a nature so as 
to appeal to all well meaning citizens. Bromises 
of reform were followed by a scathing denunciation 
of the carpetbag rule: 
Building up partisan newspapers by legis-
lation, arming militia in time of peace, 
unconstitutional attempts to take from 
the people the election of tax collectors, 
the attempted passage of the Metropolitan 
Police Bill, attempted corruption of the 
judiciary by the use of executive patronage, 
we denounce as gross outrages upon consti-
tutional liberties. While as evidence of 
the utter incapacity of our present rulers 
to administer the affairs of the state, we 
point to the mass of confusion in which the 
revenue and registration laws of the state 
have become envolved, the necessity of 
extraordinary sessions of the legislature 
to cure the blunders and follies of the 
regular sessions and to the repeated executive 
and legislative acts which have been by the 
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional and 
void. 7 , 
This was an ultimatum to the citizens. 'j,;he choice 
was left to them, but the Democrats left the con-
vention with one resolve to win the election "by 
8 
ballots if possible, by bullets if necessary". 
5. Robert Selph Henry, The Story of Reconstruction, 
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, New York, 1938, 544. 
6. Garner, 373. 
7. Dunbar Rowland, History of Mississippi, S. J. 
Clark Publishing Company, Chicago, 1925, Vol.II,196. 
8. Donald, 103. 
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The Democrats campaigned with utmost vigor. 
Men left their fields, shops and stores to take 
part in a state wide canvass. Local clubs were formed 
to make sure that every white voter had registered. 
Elaborate displays were in order; men women and 
children paraded day and night; barbecues and poli-
tical rallies were held everywhere in an attempt 
9 
to win over all honest citizens. There was a great 
display of arms and munition, so much so that it 
prompted the colored Representative in Congress to 
write: 
Nearly all Democratic clubs in the state 
were converted into armed military 
companies. 10 
But even though the clubs were semi-military in 
character, the one thing the Democratic leaders 
feared was armed conflict. Every effort was made 
to avert any riot, for they did not wish the recur-
rence of the Vicksburg aftermath. by experience 
the Democrats had learned that Negro-Republican 
majorities could be nullified by an armed and reso-
lute band of whitemen, but on the other hand they 
9. Garner, 373-374 
10. Lynch, 141. 
I,. 
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knew that federal intervention would automati-
11 
cally cancel any Democratic success. 
'l'he Republicans, for their part, equalled the 
preparations of the Democrats. Clubs were formed, 
and at weekly meetings the members were harangued 
by white leaders. 'J.'he colored were instructed how 
to register and how to vote..I.hey were indoctri-
nated by Republican politicians and came to believe 
that a Democratic victory would bring re-enslavement 
of the Negroes. Armed demonstration were also made by 
the colored who were told that they had to fight to 
12 
maintain their freedom. 
With two camps fighting for the same goal, con-
flicts were bound to occur despite the warnings and 
exhortations of the Democratic leader, General George. 
The surprising fact is not that there were riots, 
but that there were not more of them. Yazoo city 
13 
was the scene of the first racial disorder, caused 
it seems, by the speech of A. T. Morgan, sheriff and 
11. Donald, 102. 
12. Garner, 374 
13. Rowland, Iga 
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"boss" of the county. Three Negroes and one 
white lost their lives as guns fired and knives 
flashed. More serious than the riot, though, was 
the fear of Negro revenge. It was rumored that 
the plantation Negroes were arming to sack the 
city. Political differences were quickly forgotten 
as all the whites prepared to meet the mob. Fortu-
nately disaster was averted by Morgan, who appealed 
to the governor for support, rather than to the mob. 
Though promised reinstatement by the governor with 
the help of three hundred negro militia, Morgan wisely 
14 
declined in face of certain defeat and bloodshed. 
The most serious riot during the campaign was 
the one which terrorized the town of Clinton in 
15 
Hinds County. At a joint political rally tempers 
became hoo hot to control, and from an unknown source 
the firing began, with the handful of whites out-
numbered by the thousands of colored. The Negroes 
were the aggressors, and for a time the ·whites 
resisted, but soon they fled for their lives. In 
14. Henry, 546 
15. Garner, 378-381. 
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In the chase that followed two of the whites were 
horribly killed and mutilated. A general alarm 
was sent out and a citizen soldiery of two hundred 
'..vhites was formed, and re-enforcements were rushed 
to Clinton from Jackson and Vicksburg, for it was 
believed that there was to be a general massacre. 
In the days that followed a reign of terror existed 
in the community, during which Negroes were hunted 
16 
like beasts and some twenty or thirty were killed. 
Three days after the outbreak of the riot, 
Governor Ames, issued a proclamation demanding the 
immediate dispersion of all armed mobs who defied 
the laws and disturbed the peace. The whites re-
fused to disband, but instead offered to place white 
military companies at the disposal of the governor 
to maintain order should occasion arise. Governor 
Ames feared rather than trusted the white militia, 
and all too quickly sent an urgent plea to President 
Grant for federal troops. His request, however, was 
17 
curtly refused. 
16. Ibid., 378 
17. Ibid., 379-381 
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Denied Federal as~istance, Governor Ames 
proceeded to organize and enlarge the state militia. 
J.he recruits were for the most part colored since 
the Governor declared that "none but the colored 
people had respect for the state government or would 
18 
support it". It was rumored that Governor Ames 
was determined to taunt the whites with negro troops 
and thus to provoke race riots, for such major con-
flicts would insure Federal aid; with Federal aid 
and the negro troops, the governor could control the 
approaching election in the interest of the Republican 
19 
party. As company after company was organized and 
equipped, the resentment of the whites became almost 
uncontrollable. Only the urgent appeals of the 
Democratic leaders and the timely intervention of the 
Federal agent, C. K. Chase, prevented a bloody con-
flict between the whites and the blacks, and perhaps 
20 
a violent overthrow of the state government. 
18. Henry, 547 
19. Garner, 383 
20. Ibid., 388 
Between the persuasive efforts of ~~. 
Chase, the genuine desire of the 
Democratic leaders for a peaceable. 
election, and the anxiety of the 
Governor to avoid the threatening war, 
125 
it was possible to make a treaty of peace, 
by the terms of vvhich the militia was to 
be disarmed and their arms stored under 
guard; the Democratic committee was to 
guarantee order, and both sifes were to 
guarantee a fair election. 2 
Both parties to the Peace Agreement were 
faithful to their promises, and as the election day 
approached verbal conflicts supplanted bloody riots. 
General George was ever on the alert to cool the 
tempers of the hot-headed Democrats, and for the 
most part he was successful. November 2, the elec-
tion was held amid great excitement. In several 
counties passion overcame reason and riots broke out. 
This was true of only ten or twelve of the seventy-
22 
four counties. For the most part, therefore, an 
honest and peaceful election was heldo 
Under the stress of violent excitement 
there were undoubtedly cases of intimidation 
both by the Democrats and Republicans; 
but it was nearer the standard of a fair 
election than the state had witnessed for 
six years. 23 
21. Tlenry J 548. 
22. Garner, 394-395 
23. Rowland, 200 
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The election returned to the state and county 
offices an ove~Nhelming Democratic majority. Of 
the 165,000 popular votes the Democrats received 
24 
more than a 30,000 majority. The Republicans won 
only two of the six seats in the United States Oon-
gress, while in the state legislature the Democrats 
won twenty-four of the thirty-seven in the Senate and 
ninety-six of the hundred-and-seven seats in the house 
25 
of representatives. In sixty-two of the seventy-
four counties, Democratic officials were likewise 
26 
elected. The election was hailed by the Democrats 
as the great day of political emancipation, and the 
bells which were rung for the Democratic victory were 
the death knell of the Republican party. 
President Grant saw in the M.ississippi election 
only fraud and violence, and would have taken steps 
to overturn the results but national affairs demanded 
his attention instead. '.L'he cause of the government 
was defended by Hiram Revels, the first negro senator 
of tre United States. His appeal to the president 
was an important factor in maintaining the status guo. 
24. Ibid., 201 
25. Ibid.~ 200-201 
26. Garne, 395 
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He wrote: 
At the late convention, men, irrespective of 
race, color, or party affiliation, united 
and voted together against men known to be 
incompetent and dishonest. 27 
The legislature chosen in the November election 
assembled at Jackson, January 4, 1876. By common 
consent of the Democratic majority the order of 
business was to be headed by the impeachment of 
Governor Ames, his running mate, Lieutenant Governor 
Davis, and the Superintendent of Schools, Cardoza. 
This action of the legislature was expected by the 
Governor and he wrote that their purpose was "to 
complete the revolution" by clearing the state offices 
Republicans and to "restore the confederacy by voting 
28 
in Democrats". 
Investigations looking for certain grounds for 
impeachment was undertaken immediately. Lieutenant 
Governor Davis was the first to feel the strong arm 
of the body. On February 14 he was impeached for 
accepting bribes in a pardon case, and on March 13 
he was convicted by an overwhelming vote, with six 
29 
Republicans voting for his conviction. On February 
27. Henry, 549. 
28. marner 401-402 
29. Ibid., 404 
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16 a resolution which directed the impeachment 
of Cardoza was adopted, and received the affir-
mative vote of eleven Republicans, eight of whom 
were colored. Rather than be convicted the Super-
of Schools resigned on the e2nd and the impeach-
30 
ment proceedings against him were dropped. 
Action to secure the impeachment of Governor 
Ames was begun on March 2, and the trial was set 
for the 28th. On the day of the trial the counsel 
for the defendent proposed that if the charges 
against the governor were dismissed he would resign 
his office in honor. ~his proposal was accepted by 
the legislature. The House withdrew the charges 
and the Senate dismissed them. In both cases the 
31 
vote was almost unanimous. On the following day 
Governor Ames formally sent his resignation to the 
32 
people of Mississippi. John M. Stone, president 
of the Senate was thereupon ushered into the Governor's 
office and the Reconstruction government in Mississippi 
was at an end. 
30. Rowland, 202. 
31. Garner, 405-407 
32. John Seymore McNeilly, "Climax and Collapse of 
Reconstruction in Mississippi," as quoted by 
Rowland, 204. 
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And thus was severed the last strand 
of the Gordian knot binding Mississippi 
to the abomination3gf Carpetbag and negro domination. 
Atter the removal of the Republicans from the 
high offices of the state, the legislature corrected 
item by item the flagrant abuses of Radical misrule. 
Although there were no more impeachments, the blood 
sucking offices and agenCies were abolished directly 
34 
or indirectly. State publications were reduced in 
number, and the district printing bill repealled, 
thereby abolishing a large number of partisan papers. 
The Gatling Gun Bill was repealled, and the militia 
was paralyzed by the reduction of pay. The salaries 
of all officials and state employees were substantially 
reduced. i'Jor did the judiciary escape the purge, for 
the number of chancellors and circuit judges was con-
siderably reduced. The elaborate and expensive school 
system established by the Republicans was converted 
into one of practical economy. Revision of finances 
reduced state taxation from 9 and 1/4 to 6 and 1/2 
mills on the dollar within the first month of the new 
35 
regime. 
33. John Seymore McNeilly, "Climax and Collapse of 
Reconstruction in lVlississippi "1 as quoted by 
Rowland 204. 34. Garner, 4 0-413. 35. Ibid.,410- 13 
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The sweeping reform of the financial and 
administrative system netted immediate results. 
At last the budged was balanced; total receipts 
for 1786 amounted to $981,393; total disbursements 
36 
$820,002. 'I'he period of economy had come and 
once again lViississippi was to be given the oppo..r-
tunity to make her own way in the world. 
The end of the carpetbag chapter in Mississippi's 
history was not, however, to be written until late 
in 1876, when the Republican Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, Peyton, and his associate Tarbell, 
retired in November, and Democratic successors were 
37 
subsequently appointed. In the same month, a 
solid Democratic ticket was elected to represent 
Mississippi in the United States Congress. Demo-
cratic victory was now complete, for as they became 
entrenched in all the offices, it was evident that 
the Republican party was dead beyond all hope of 
revival. But this was in 1876, eleven years after 
the horrible fratricide had ended; eleven long years 
of forced rule, fear and hate. 
36. Rowland, 207-208 
37. Garner, 413 .. 
CHAFTER VIII 
A SKELETON IN OUR CLOSET 
From time to time the old bones which are 
hidden deep in our nation's closet rattle and in 
so doing remind us of a dark period in our country's 
ff " 
history. Had the evil effects of the tragic era 
been only temporary, we might have been able to 
forget; had the wounds hot been so deep, time might 
have healed them, but so bitter was the resentment 
in the hearts of southerners that even today they 
hate the "damned yankee". 
Mississippi and the southern states were faced 
with social, economis, financial, and political pro-
blems which, unfortunately, they themselves were not 
permitted to meet until irreparable damage had been 
done. Only after the Radical Republican leaders had 
spent themselves in avenging private grudges, only 
after a Republican Congress had made such an utter 
mess of things, only after the Republican party had 
wholly alienated the southern whites, were the 
southerners able, through sweat and blood, to win 
the right to solve the problems themselves. It is 
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It is little wonder today that that party has 
such a small following in the South. Do what 
they may, the Republicans cannot undo what has 
already been done; they cannot erase the picture 
they themselves have imprinted on the memories of 
the southerners nor the fact from the pages of our 
historyo 
By 1876 home rule was finally restored in the 
majority of the southern states. Meanwhile in 
Mississippi, as well as in her sister states, the 
entire super-structure of life had been undermined. 
Political, social and economic problems had to be 
faced after Appomatox, but unfortunately they were 
faced at a time when greed, hatred and vengence 
ruled the hearts of men. Had there been time for 
tempers to cool and wounds to heal, the story might 
have been different. but time waits for no man. 
The problems were met, but not solved. What the 
Republicans considered a panacea for all southern 
trOUble, proved to be acid upon open wounds that 
would ache and torment for eleven long years. 
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The southern states, Mississippi especially, 
were left destitute after the war. The accumulated 
capital invested in Confederate stocks, bonds and 
currency, was now worthless, their banks had collapsed 
and the largest investment, two billion dollars in 
slaves, had been wiped out. Factories had been 
destroyed or dismantled; mining had been paralyzed. 
Their only hope lay in the land, but here too they 
were baffled. Farms had deteriorated during the 
war, equipment had worn out, fences rotted, fields 
became overgrown, stock destroyed. Laborers were few. 
Besides the loss of Negroes, Mississippi suffered the 
( 
loss of one half of the male whites, and of those re-
turning one half bore scars of battle. Land value 
tumbled; almost everyone was poor. Readjustment, 
under the most favorable conditions, would have been 
a very difficult task. Tact, firmness and good will 
were required in full measure, but, sad to say, the 
Radical Republicans were gifted only with firmness. 
What might have proven to be an acceptable plan 
of reconstruction, the merciful program of Lincoln 
and Johnson, was scrapped in favor of the hard, 
134 
revengeful policies of Congress. '.L'he 
Presidental program had been inaugurated and had 
been acceptable to the South as well as to many 
northerners, but it was not to withstand the oppo-
sition of Oharles Sumner in the senate, and Thaddeus 
Stevens in the house. They attacked the work of 
the administration on two points: first, if this 
reconstruction work should be accepted as final, 
presidential supremacy would be continued; and 
secondly, it let the South off without public con-
fession of sin and without due punishment. Undoubtedly 
the Radicals represented a minority when they set out 
to undo what had been done, but they had the untold 
advantage of a smoothly working organization under 
the leadership of Sumner and Stevens. 
At first this element had no definite program, 
but it did have a general idea of what it wanted: 
stevens avowedly hated the average southern whites 
and wanted to see them punished; Sumner desired to 
see the work of the war rounded out by elevating 
the freed Negro to a position of social and political 




were conservative Repuc;licans who, unfortunately, 
had no clear cut program or leader of their own, 
and Democrats , still under a cloud because of the 
Copperhead element in their ranks. Had there been 
some one to coalesce tfuis anti-Radical strength, as 
Lincoln possibly might have done, the story of recon-
struction might not have been so sordid. 
When the first post-war congress assembled, the 
Radicals were busily engaged in undermining the presi-
dential plan. ~hose southerners who presented them-
selves as senators and representatives were refused 
seats in the respective houses lest they have a voice 
in determining their own fate. Capitalizing on, and 
over-emphasizing the conditions in the South, the 
Radicals were successful in capturing public opinion, 
and so placed President Johnson on the defensive. 
In short order Congress passed a new Freedman's 
Bureau Act and a Civil Rights Bill which ceme to be 
law despite the president's veto. Johnson's ill 
advised condemnation of the latter lost for him the 
support of many moderate Republicans in congress 
and in the country at large. Victory at the polls 
\. 
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in 1866 was interpreted as a vote of confidence 
by the RadicalS, and with their strength augmented 
by some fifty votes, it was only a matter of time 
till their entire program was actualized. In 
rapid succession reconstruction bills and consti-
tutional amendments were introduced and passed by 
congress, the sum and substance of which was to 
curtail the powers of the chief executive and to 
humble the South. 
Military commanders and subordinate officials 
were appointed by congress and the former was made 
supreme. The major portion of southern whites 
was disfranchised, and in the reconstruction con-
ventions throughout the South the Carpet-baggers, 
Scalawags and Negroes were dominant. Members of 
these unwanted classes met with little opposition 
and were elected to state as well as national office. 
As a result lawlessness and disorder prevailed to 
an alarming degree; reckless extravagance and almost 
unparalleled venality on the part of officials 
meant tremendous increase of state and local debt 
as well as taxation. 
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Radical control of state and national govern-
ments depended on the suppression of the political 
powers of the southern whites and the control of 
the Negro votes. Locally the control of offices 
meant the perpetuation of authority so long as the 
protecting arm of the national government was not 
withdrawn, and it would not be withdrawn as long as 
the Radicals steered the ship. Consequently the 
Freedman's Bureau, the Union League and, oftentimes, 
educational works and even churches, were little 
more than political tools used to maintain the poli-
tical machine by securing a straight Republican vote. 
The few whites among ,their ranks gradually deserted 
the party as they becam.e disgusted with the methods 
used and the results produced. Consequently to the 
southerners, Repllblicans came to mean Negroes, 
~orthern carpet-baggers and federal office holders 
leaning all the time more heavily upon the Washington 
government. 
As early as 1868 the structure erected by the 
Radical leaders had to be reenforced. In the 
presidential election of that year Grant was carried 
into office on the Negro vote, but in several states 
138 
Republican control wavered. Congress therefore 
rushed to aid the tottering structure by passing 
the ]'ifteenth amendment and the Enforcement Acts 
which were designed to place election under federal 
rather than state control. but the Radicals had 
overplayed their hand. 'J.'he South was lost to the 
Republicans as the whites united to form a "solid 
South". In the North, too, men were tired of trying 
to reform the South by outside agencies, and more and 
more were convinced that the South should be left to 
deal with its own problems. Consequently the Repub-
lican party was split into the Liberals and Radicals, 
and although the former were not strong enough to 
carry the election of 1872 nevertheless their views 
and objectives had to be reckoned with. Consequently, 
by an act of Congress, the political disabilities 
were removed from almost all but a few hundred of 
those originally proscribed. 
In 1874 the Republican majority in the house was 
finally overturned, the first time since 1861, and 
the Democrats had a voice in national legislation. 
One by one the southern states succeeded in ousting 
139 
the Negroes, carpetbaggers and scalawags from 
local, state and national offices. Thus by the 
fall of 1876 when Mississippi re-established 
home rule, the reconstruction governments in all 
but Florida, South Carolina and Louisiana had come 
to an end. The newly elected state governments lost 
no time in righting the wrongs of the past eleven 
years. 
The Republicans who had once envisioned a 
solid political power in Mississippi and in the 
other southern states saw their elaborate system 
crumble; the carpetbaggers who had come to prey on 
the conquered found themselves without friends, 
influence or wealth. Outcasts of southern society, 
both were forced out of the state, out of the South. 
What could have been theirs was now gone, and they 
had only themselves to blame. It was not the fact 
of the emancipation of the slaves that had turned 
Mississippi and the South against them, it was the 
tragic era of reconstruction. In 1876, when 
Mississippi finally became a state for the lViississ-
ippians, the door was firmly closed against the 
140 
Republican Party, and to this day it has not 
been re-opened, because written on the pages of 
its history is a story the South cannot forget -
the story of reconstruction. 
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